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Incarceration has crept its way into the mainstream of American
society. It no longer conjures an emotional reaction. In fact, for
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many populations, it is a predictable destination. For others, it is a
fate easily justified. "Since the mid 1990s, the war on drugs, the war
on gangs, the war on terror, 'zero tolerance' and sentencing policies
such as 'three strikes and you're out[,]' 'mandatory minimum
sentences[,]' and 'truth in sentencing' have all contributed to the
dramatic increase in the number of people sent to prison in the
United States and in the length of sentences they serve." 2 Simply put,
incarceration has become an industry in the United States. "The
United States incarcerates more people than any other country in the
world, including countries that are much more heavily populated."3
"The United States now has five percent of the world's population,
twenty-five percent of its prisoners, and probably the vast majority of
prisoners who are in long-term solitary confinement." "The fastest-
growing segment of most state budgets is corrections."'
"[T]oday's prisons and jails are more dangerous because of the
unpredictability of the inmate population, which is composed of a
new and highly distilled group of inmates."6 "This population is also
more alienated, more violent, less afraid of punishment, and more
difficult to manage."' Because of this, "there has been a significant
shift in the duties and priorities of wardens during the past two
decades. One of the foremost changes is the increased attention
toward safety and security, and this is a consequence of changing
external and internal priorities."8
When making disciplinary and management determinations,
prison officials have on their shoulders the enormous weight of
maintaining order in the institution; protecting the public, the inmate
population, and staff from harm and danger by predatory inmates;
and respecting the constitutional rights of inmates, those prone to bad
2. Sharon Shalev, Inside a Supermax, 181 PRISON SERVICE J. 21,21 (2009), available
at http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/assets/documents/100043E5Inside-aSupermax.pdf.
3. LYNN S. BRANHAM & MICHAEL S. HAMDEN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE
LAW AND POLICY OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 3 (8th ed. 2009).
4. Atul Gawande, Hellhole: The United States Holds Tens of Thousands of Inmates
in Long-Term Solitary Confinement. Is this Torture?, THE NEW YORKER (Mar. 30, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/03/30/090330fa-fact-gawande.
5. Jess Maghan, Corrections Countdown: Prisoners at the Cusp of the 21st Century, in
PRISON AND JAIL ADMINISTRATION: PRACTICE AND THEORY 199, 206 (Peter M.
Carlson & Judith Simon Garrett eds., Aspen Publishers, Inc. 1999).
6. Id. at 201.
7. Id.
8. Rick Ruddell & Tommy Norris, The Changing Role of Wardens: A Focus on
Safety and Security, CORRECTIONS TODAY, Oct. 2008, at 3, http://www.aca.org/
fileupload/177/ahaidar/Ruddell.pdf.
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behavior, as well as those likely to be victimized. Much like parents
who, by virtue of domestic intelligence and constant oversight, know
of their child's tendencies and capabilities, prison administrators
know the propensities of those in their care. This ability is part art
and part skill and, admittedly, is a necessary part of institutional
management. There is simply no way to remove the essential role of
judgment in prison administration. And this is no call to do so.
This Article does, however, challenge the arbitrariness often
involved in deciding who is assigned to solitary confinement, the
indefinite nature of many solitary confinement assignments, and the
hollowness of the periodic review process afforded inmates who are
subject to prolonged isolation.9 The absence of meaningful standards
applicable to the periodic review process renders inmates vulnerable
to the discretion of prison officials, some of whom cravenly seek to
impress inmates with their authority and sense of importance. Both
fairness and commonsense call for a change in the way we use
isolation as a disciplinary and managerial tool in our prisons. In
seeking to maintain order in prisons, prison officials must balance the
necessary use of power with respect for inmates' constitutional rights.
"[T]hough... rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies
of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly stripped of
constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a crime."o
"Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process
9. I recognize that, while the practice of isolation has been longstanding,
nomenclature used to describe the practice has been ever changing. Today, many
correctional facilities reject the use of the term solitary confinement in favor of
administrative segregation, punitive segregation, disciplinary segregation, extended
lockdown, closed-cell restriction, special housing unit, special management unit or
intensive management unit.
In this work, the terms solitary confinement, segregation and isolation are used
interchangeably. These terms are used generically to refer to any of the various forms of
segregation practices used in penal institutions where inmates are housed separately from
the general population and involuntarily confined to their cells for nearly the entire day;
interaction with other humans is nonexistent or severely limited; and meaningful
programming is removed as a result of disciplinary or administrative action. This work
does not extend to death row inmates who are held in isolation as a result of classification
and/or sentencing. The constitutional considerations applicable to death row inmates are
radically different from those advanced herein. For this reason, death row inmates, who
are also segregated from the general population, are not addressed herein and this work
should not be interpreted as having application to them.
In this work, the terms long-term solitary confinement or prolonged isolation is
intended to refer to segregated housing that extends four months or more per assignment.
10. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555 (1974).
Clause."" In a prison setting, due process means a fair process that is
meaningful and not routine. The process should be customized,
inquiry driven, and object based. It should never look like the rote
process one undergoes when a meal is ordered at a fast food
establishment: fast, undiscerning, abstracted, and impersonal.
This work, using the Angola 3 as a case study, examines the legal
and practical implications of prolonged solitary confinement.12
Section II explores how the practice of solitary confinement has
evolved over time to now include what I term "perception profiling."
Section III introduces the Angola 3 case, a local case with national
implications. It is believed that the Angola 3 have been held in
isolation for a longer period of time than have any other prisoners in
the United States.13 The Angola 3 case illustrates what can happen
when unchecked authority and intolerance become bedfellows. It
demonstrates what can happen when a regime, sensing a threat, has
the power to shackle organizing efforts in a purgatory where voices of
organizers compete with the power of silence and the grip of
isolation. Section IV uses the Angola 3 case as a backdrop for
discussing legal concerns that have emanated from the modern usage
of solitary confinement and prolonged isolation. In particular, the
section discusses: (1) meaningful due process in the confines of
periodic inmate review hearings intended to determine if an inmate
should be released from prolonged isolation; (2) how the current
practice of prolonged isolation undermines the Doctrine of
Separation of Powers; and (3) how the diminished role of courts in
prison affairs can encourage abuses by prison officials. Against this
backdrop, a proposal for reform is presented in Section V. This
reform proposal comes in the form of a national legislative model for
the periodic review process. This legislative model is offered with the
hope that it will aid states in ensuring that due process protections are
afforded to prisoners subject to isolation. The conclusion is found in
Section VI.
11. Id. at 556.
12. Robert Wilkerson King, Herman Wallace, and Albert Woodfox are hereinafter
referred to as "the Angola 3."
13. See Laura Sullivan, Favors, Inconsistencies Taint Angola Murder Case, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=96199165.
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I. Solitary Confinement
In a world where people are removed from the general public
because of an inability to conform to rules in society, it is no surprise
that maintaining order behind prison walls comes with a unique set of
challenges. In a narrow sense, prison administrators are tasked with
doing what parents, schools and law enforcement could not: convert
rule breakers to rule followers. The approaches and methodologies
for accomplishing this feat have changed and evolved over time.
During colonial times, public humiliation and physical
punishment were common ways of punishing those who deviated
from societal expectations. 4 "Discipline in the early 1800s was part of
a penal philosophy aimed at individual reform through silence,
solitude, and repentance."" "Work separation from amoral
influences, and strict rules were aids to instill character in the
inmates ... " "As prisons grew in size and administrative
complexity, humanitarian reformists were replaced by state
bureaucrats, and individual rehabilitation was replaced by economic
efficiency as an institutional goal."" Corporal punishment as a means
of discipline followed, but was short-lived." "Although corporal
punishment has virtually been eliminated by major reforms that have
taken place in the last century, the philosophy of controlling behavior
through strict discipline remained critical to the management of penal
institutions."l 9 "Today, with the help of high-tech solutions, prisons
are now locking up more prisoners using few guards-and at the same
time furthering the trend toward less rehabilitation and more
punishment."20 "In response to the apparent failure of rehabilitative
philosophy and policies, the prevailing policy sees prisons as places to
incarcerate and punish inmates in an effort to deter crime."2'
"Corrections officials and guards now take a wholly combative stance
toward prisoners, rather than a rehabilitative or even a custodial
14. See BRANHAM & HAMDEN, supra note 4, at 2-3.





20. Jim Rendon, Inside the New High-Tech Lock-Downs, in THE AMERICAN PRISON
SYSTEM 145,146 (Peter G. Herman ed., 2001).
21. KENNETH J. PEAK, JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION POLICE, COURTS, &
CORRECTIONS MANAGEMENT 219 (2d ed. 1998).
one." 22 "They receive training in military combat techniques and the
use of high tech weapons."" Prison administrators have much
latitude when it comes to discipline and management.
"Prolonged isolation was used sparingly, if at all, by most
American prisons for almost a century."24 Prolonged solitary
confinement is now prominently used as both a disciplinary tool and
as an administrative, or management, tool. 25  One expert has
remarked that "segregation is used far more frequently, for far longer
periods of time, and under far harsher conditions than is legitimately
needed to manage inmate security." 26 The first supermax prison-an
institution specifically designed for mass solitary confinement-was
not established until 1983.27 Over the past two decades, solitary
confinement has moved out of the prison basement and into whole
facilities built just for isolation.28 "These places have many names-
supermax, intensive-management units, secure housing-but the
meaning is the same: years alone, out of the public view and away
from public oversight." 29 The federal government even operates such
a facility.30 Existing alongside these supermax prisons are traditional
jails and penitentiaries that offer both dormitory-style housing units,
as well as isolation units. The popularity of solitary confinement as a
22. Cassandra Shaylor, "It's Like Living in a Black Hole": Women of Color and
Solitary Confinement in the Prison Industrial Complex, 24 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 385, 406 (1998).
23. Id. at 406-07.
24. Gawande, supra note 4.
25. Prisoners can be sent to solitary confinement for any of the following reasons:
Punishment, protection, prison management, national security, investigatory purposes or
lack of other institutional solutions. See SHARON SHALEV, A SOURCEBOOK ON
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 25-26 (2008), available at http://solitaryconfinement.org/
uploads/sourcebook web.pdf. These distinctions are not pertinent to a conversation about
a meaningful review process because, generally, once an inmate is held in isolation for a
prolonged period, constitutional standards require that a review process be invoked,
despite the reason for the assignment. Accordingly, this work speaks generically of
isolation and does not, in every instance, differentiate as to the basis for the isolation.
26. Maria Godoy, Q&A: Solitary Confinement & Human Rights, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(July 27, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5586 937 .
27. See Gawande, supra note 4.
28. Laura Sullivan, In U.S. Prisons, Thousands Spend Years in Isolation, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO (July 26, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5582144.
29. Id.
30. See 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean Version of Hell (CBS television broadcast
June 19, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/11/60minutes/main33577 27.shtml
(discussing the United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum, which opened in
Colorado in 1994).
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management method has even caught on in other forums, such as
psychoeducational schools and programs.
In the prison context, "[t]he imposition of long-term isolation-
which can be for months or years-is ultimately at the discretion of
prison administrators." 32  "Most inmates held in solitary have no
contact with the outside world other than the U.S. mail."3 3 in some
facilities, mail is limited.34 "Depending on the state, inmates have
limited access to visitors," as well as the prison library" and are often
housed in small, windowless cells with hardly any natural light. 7
"Most can't watch television, call anyone on the phone or even touch
another person while in the units."3  A number of the isolated
prisoners "live with extensive surveillance and security controls, the
absence of ordinary social interaction, abnormal environmental
stimuli, often only three to five hours a week of recreation alone in
caged enclosures, and little, if any, educational, vocational, or other
purposeful activities (i.e., programming)."3 9 In most cases, inmates
live alone in cells where they are held for twenty-three hours a day."
The will to preserve the practice is strong. Inmates who have
attempted hunger strikes as a means of escaping their fate have been
force-fed three meals per day.4'
There is no shortage of information establishing the adverse
medical affects of prolonged solitary confinement. 42 "Psychological
31. See Stephen Gurr, Georgia Bans School Seclusion Rooms, GAINSVILLE TIMES
(July 9, 2010), http://www.gainesvilletimes.com/archives/35176/ (reporting the death of a
thirteen-year-old student who hanged himself while being held in an eight-by-eight-foot
seclusion room for intervals of eight hours at a time).
32. Gawande, supra note 4.
33. Sullivan, In U.S. Prisons, Thousands Spend Years in Isolation, supra note 28.
34. See 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean Version of Hell, supra note 30.
35. Sullivan, In U.S. Prisons, Thousands Spend Years in Isolation, supra note 28.
36. See Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 144 (3d Cir. 2000).
37. See Jones 'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1099 (W.D. Wis. 2001).
38. Sullivan, In U.S. Prisons, Thousands Spend Years in Isolation, supra note 28.
39. Jeffrey L. Metzner & Jamie Fellner, Solitary Confinement and Mental Illness in
U.S. Prisons: A Challenge for Medical Ethics, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 104 (2010),
available at http://www.jaapl.org/cgi/reprint/38/1/104.
40. See Gans v. Rozum, No. 06-62J, 2007 WL 2571527, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2007);
see also Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 526 (2006) and Langley v. Coughlin, 709 F. Supp.
482, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
41. See 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean Version of Hell, supra note 30.
42. See generally Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and
"Supermax" Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 124, 148 (2003), available at
http://www.capdefnet.org/pdf library/temp/Seminars/12-02/Haney-C&DFinalDraft-
R.pdf; Craig Haney, The Social Psychology of Isolation: Why Solitary Confinement Is
effects can include anxiety, depression, anger, cognitive disturbances,
perceptual distortions, obsessive thoughts, paranoia, and psychosis."43
It has been documented that the absence of social interaction one
experiences in prolonged isolation can result in the brain becoming as
impaired as the brain of a person who has experienced a traumatic
brain injury.' Interestingly, similar medical findings have been made
where animals have been subject to prolonged isolation for research
purposes.45 Unlike with human prisoners, however, groups of people
have organized to demand an end to solitary confinement for
animals.46
The conditions of confinement described herein have been
47
subject to challenges without success. Courts simply do not seem to
Psychologically Harmful, 181 PRISON SERVICE J. 12 (2009), available at
http://www.hmprisonservice.gov.uk/assets/documents/100043E3the social-psychof isolat
ion.pdf; SHALEV, supra note 25, at 25-26; Open Letter from Trudy Bond, Ph.D., and
Stephen Soldz, Ph.D., President, Psychologists for Soc. Responsibility, to Robert M.
Gates, Sec'y of Def., on the Solitary Confinement of PFC Bradley Manning (Jan. 3, 2011),
http://www.psysr.orglabout/programs/humanrights/gates-manning-letter.php; Gawande,
supra note 4; Metzner & Fellner, supra note 39; John Gibbons & Nicholas de B.
Katzenbach, Confronting Confinement: A Report of The Commission on Safety and Abuse
in America's Prisons, 22 WASH U. J.L. & POL'Y 385, 471 (2006) (recommending that penal
institutions "stop isolating people and ensure that segregated prisoners have regular and
meaningful human contact and are free from extreme physical conditions that can cause
lasting harm"); Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH U.
J.L. & POL'Y 325 (2006); Lorna Rhodes, Pathological Effects of the Supermaximum
Prison, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1692 (2005), available at 2005 WLNR 16556622.
43. See Metzner & Fellner, supra note 39.
44. Gawande, supra note 4.
45. See Chris Adams, Some Chimps Never Recover from Stresses of Research,
MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS (April 24, 2011), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/04/24/v-
print/112432/some-chimps-never-recover-from.html (noting that many chimpanzees
housed in isolation for prolonged periods experienced depression and adverse changes in
personality or aggression, and also observed that some of the chimpanzees became
"chronic hair pluckers," engaged in self-mutilation, or experienced premature cardiac
death).
46. See id.
47. See LeMaire v. Maass, 12 F.3d 1444 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding severe restrictions
on an inmate held in a disciplinary segregation unit); Clifton v. Robinson, 500 F. Supp. 30,
34 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 1970))
(concluding that "segregated confinement in solitary or maximum security is not per se
banned by the Eighth Amendment"); In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates
Designated as Five Percenters, 174 F.3d 464, 472 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Sweet v. S.C.
Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854, 861 (4th Cir. 1975)) (remarking that "'isolation from
companionship,' 'restriction on intellectual stimulation[,] and prolonged inactivity,'
inescapable accompaniments of segregated confinement, will not render [solitary]
confinement unconstitutional absent other illegitimate deprivations").
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view the conditions of these isolation cells as inhumane.48  To
illustrate this point, one might consider the perspective of a court
faced with a constitutional challenge as to the conditions of solitary
confinement. This court responded to the inmate's challenge with the
following editorial: These conditions are "uncomfortable and
upsetting-nothing more."49 Similarly, another court expressed that
"[i]nactivity, lack of companionship and a low level of intellectual
stimulation do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment even if
they continue for an indefinite period of time. . . "'o
Given the level of human involvement in the process of prison
management, it goes without saying that there is no way to ensure
total objectivity, perfection or scientific accuracy of decision-making.
At best, one might hope for a reasoned approach to prison discipline
and management once the decision is made to put a prisoner in
isolation. The current practice of arbitrarily selecting inmates for
prolonged isolation defies reason and ignores peer advice.
The American Bar Association ("ABA") advises that
"[s]egregated housing should be for the briefest term and under the
least restrictive conditions practicable and consistent with the
rationale for placement and with the progress achieved by the
48. For an illustration of the magnitude of what must be established to convince a
court of an Eighth Amendment violation, see, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1305
(5th Cir. 1974) (punishment of prisoner by confinement in small, dirty cell without light,
hygienic materials, adequate food, heat; prisoner also was punished through
administration of milk of magnesia); LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972)
(finding an Eighth Amendment violation where an inmate was confined in small strip cell
for five days in total silence with almost no reading materials, light, human interaction or
opportunity to exercise and having to eat and sleep in closed confines with his own waste);
Burns v. Swenson, 430 F.2d 771, 777-78 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1062 (1972)
(expressing that segregated confinement in solitary or maximum security is not per se
banned by the Eighth Amendment); Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1211 (5th Cir.
1977) (holding that the totality of these circumstances at Angola constitute an Eighth
Amendment violation: More than 270 inmate-on-inmate stabbings in three years,
numerous inmate-on-inmate rapes, overcrowding, insufficient cell space to segregate
dangerous prisoners, a shortage of guards, easy inmate access to machinery resulting in
widespread possession of weapons, life threatening fire and safety hazards, unsanitary
kitchen conditions, a rodent problem, illiterate and/or undereducated and untrained
inmates performing the majority of medical functions, an absence of registered nurses and
untrained persons acting as pharmacist, and lack of a psychiatric unit); Hutto v. Finney,
437 U.S. 678 (1978) (finding an Eighth Amendment violation where groups of inmates
were housed in small, windowless isolation cells contaning no furniture, a water source
and a toilet that could only be flushed from outside the cell; at night, given mattresses that
had been used by inmates suffering from infectious diseases; and fed less than 1000
calories a day by way of a loaf containing several foods blended together and baked).
49. See Gans v. Rozum, No. 06-62J, 2007 WL 2571527, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2007).
50. Bono v. Saxbe, 620 F.2d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 1980).
prisoner."" Amnesty International has called for an "end to long-
term confinement in conditions of isolation."52 Juan E. Mendez, the
Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council On Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment,
issued a report to the General Assembly of the United Nations calling
for an end to indefinite solitary confinement, its use as a disciplinary
measure, its use in pretrial detention situations, and its use upon
juveniles and persons with mental disabilities. His report also called
for greater procedural protections for persons subject to isolation."
The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights advises that "[e]fforts addressed to the abolition of
solitary confinement as a punishment, or to the restriction of its use,
should be undertaken and encouraged."54 The American
Correctional Association has also indicated that "[t]otal isolation as
punishment for a rule violation is not an acceptable practice."" To
say these charges have fallen on deaf ears would be a gross
understatement.
As is the current practice, there is no real indicator as to who a
likely candidate for isolation is and there is no consistency with
respect to how long one might remain in an isolation unit. Prisoners
have been put in isolation for having in their cells ink pens with metal
in the tip," possessing tobacco," talking back to officers, assisting
fellow inmates with legal filings," serving as jailhouse lawyers," filing
51. Standards on Treatment of Prisoners, AM. BAR ASS'N CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SECTION, http://www.americanbar.org/publications/criminal-justice-section-archive/crim
just standardsjtreatmentprisoners.html#23-2.7 (last visited April 4, 2012).
52. Detention and Imprisonment, AMNESTY INT'L, http://www.amnesty.org/en/
detention (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
53. See The Secretary-General, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur of the
Human Rights Council on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 22-24, submitted to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5,2011).
54. See Basic Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/
basicprinciples.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011).
55. AM. CORR. ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 69
(4th ed. 2003) (referencing standard #4-4249).
56. See Ferguson v. Cain, No. 2009 CA 2017, 2010 WL 1838895, at *1 (La. Ct. App.
May 7, 2010).
57. See COMM'N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS, CONFRONTING
CONFINEMENT 53 (2006).
58. Id.
59. See Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 633 (E.D. Va. 1971).
60. See Bonnie Kerness, Speech at the U.S. Social Forum (June 25, 2010), in Voices
from the "Torture Chambers": Solitary Confinement and Political Repression, Solitary
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grievances, instituting legal proceedings against the penal facility,62
using profane language, having charisma and leadership traits,
serving as prison activists65 or whistleblowers," having militant and/or
radical political beliefs, participating in or organizing hunger strikes
in prison,' and refusing to get out of the shower quickly enough.69
Muslim and Rastafarian inmates practicing their faith by refusing to
cut their hair have been put in prolonged isolation.o Inmates have
Watch (July 11, 2010), http://solitarywatch.com/2010/07/11/letters-from-the-torture-chambers-
solitary-confinement-and-political-repression/.
61. See Shaylor, supra note 22, at 399.
62. See Landman, 333 F. Supp. at 636; see also Shaylor, supra note 22, at 398-99
(discussing a study that concluded jailhouse lawyers were found to be by far the largest
number of those in control units).
63. See Landman, 333 F. Supp. at 640.
64. See 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean Version of Hell, supra note 30 (Warden
Robert Hood explained that inside the supermax facility, there is an even higher level of
confinement called ultramax. In these cells, the warden tells "there's virtually no human
contact, not even with guards." As to why the 1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi
Yousef is in ultramax, the warden notes a fear that, if allowed to interact with others, he
could effectively organize and give orders.); see also Shaylor, supra note 23, at 399
(remarking that many prisoners are sent to control units for organizing other prisoners to
respond to prison conditions); see also WILBERT RIDEAU, IN THE PLACE OF JUSTICE: A
STORY OF PUNISHMENT AND DELIVERANCE 56 (2010) (wherein former inmate Wilbert
Rideau reports gaining "martyr" status amongst the inmates after his death sentence was
commuted to life. He reports being isolated during one part of his incarceration due to
respect he commanded from other inmates.).
65. See Kerness, supra note 60.
66. See Cruel and Usual: US Solitary Confinement, KASHMIR MONITOR, Mar. 22,
2011, available at 2011 WLNR 7632506 (mentioning that an inmate was placed in solitary
confinement for two and one-half months after reporting a sex-for-information racket run
by guards and detailing how another inmate ended up in solitary confinement after it was
discovered that the inmate was reporting information to a radio station).
67. See MCSHANE, supra note 16, at 138.
68. See Lateef Mungin, Thousands of California Prisoners on Hunger Strike, CNN
(Oct. 4, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/04/justice/california-prison-hunger-strike/
index.html.
69. Gawande, supra note 4.
70. It has been reported that a Rastafarian inmate who refused to cut his hair has
spent at least ten years in isolation as a result of this decision. See Dena Potter, Rasta
Inmates Spend 10 Years in Isolation for Hair, SEATILE TIMES (May 7, 2010), http://seattle
times.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2011807062_apusrastafariansegregation.html; see
also McRae v. Johnson, 261 F. App'x 554 (4th Cir. 2008) (unreported) (At issue was a
policy requiring that all beards be shaved, that male inmates wear their hair no longer than
their shirt collar, and that mustaches extend no further than the corners of the mouth.
Regardless of security level and regardless of religious beliefs, inmates who violated this
grooming policy were subject to being charged with an infraction, sent to administrative
segregation, and possibly reclassified to a higher security level, or could have a reduction
in good conduct credit); see also Ragland v. Powell, 193 F. App'x 218 (4th Cir. 2006).
been put in isolation for merely having gang affiliations;" being new
to an institution;72 being gay," transgendered, 74 or HIV positive;75
being victims of a prison attack;7 ' and for being of Muslim descent.77
71. See COMM'N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS, supra note 58, at
54-55; see also Koch v. Lewis, 216 F. Supp. 2d 994 (D. Ariz. 2001), vacated as moot, 399
F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 2005) (wherein an inmate was held in solitary confinement for over five
years based on his status as a member of the Aryan Brotherhood, absent any evidence of
misconduct. The evidence establishing his membership at the hearing was a photograph of
him with other known members, membership lists seized from inmates, and associations
with members); see also Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax Prisons
Based Upon Alleged Gang Affiliations: A Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a
Proposal for Greater Procedural Requirements, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1115 (1995) (arguing that
segregation of gang members should be based upon evidence of an actual infraction rather
than status as a gang member); see also Munoz v. Rowland, 104 F.3d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir.
1997) (after being validated as an associate of a prison gang, the inmate was assigned to
secure housing indefinitely). A subsidiary concern involves the question of how
membership in a gang is determined. On this point:
[I]t is the government which gets to define what a "security threat group" is.
According to a national survey conducted by the Department of Justice in 1997,
the Departments of Corrections of Minnesota and Oregon named all Asians as
gangs, which Minnesota further compounds by adding all Native Americans.
The State of New Jersey DOC lists the Black Cat Collective as a gang. The
Black Cat Collective is my free foster son along with two friends who put on
Afro-Centric cultural programs in libraries.
AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., SURVIVORS MANUAL: SURVIVAL IN SOLITARY 5-6 (2008),
available at http://realcostofprisons.org/materials/Survivors manuaL2008-11-24.pdf.
Perhaps there is a historical basis for this conduct. After all, in the late 1960s government
officials considered the Black Panther Party (BPP) a "street gang" under the loose
meaning they employed. See WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF
REPRESSION: THE FBI'S SECRET WARS AGAINST THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND
THE AMERICAN INDIAN MOVEMENT 66 (2d ed. 2002).
72. See Tara Young, Judges' Orders for Solitary Aren't Set In Stone Corrections
Department Decides Where Inmates Go, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 26, 1999, at B1, available
at 1999 WLNR 1179461 (noting that inmates who are new to Angola are held in lockdown
for a minimum of three months).
73. See Gabriel Arkles, Safety and Solidarity Across Gender Lines: Rethinking
Segregation of Transgender People in Detention, in PRISON LAW 2010, at 343, 358-359
(PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Criminal Law & Urban Problems Course Handbook Ser.
No. 224, 2010); see also R.G. v. Koller, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (D. Haw. 2006); see also In re
Jackson, 895 N.Y.S.2d 633, 635 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
74. See Arkles, supra note 73, at 358-59; see also R.G., 415 F. Supp. 2d 1129; In re
Jackson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 635.
75. See Arkles, supra note 73, at 359; see also Margaret Winter & Stephen F. Hanlon,
Parchman Farm Blues: Pushing for Prison Reforms at Mississippi State Penitentiary, 35
LITIGATION 6 (Fall 2008), available at http://www.aclu.orglimageslasset~upload file829-
41138.pdf.
76. See In re Jackson, 895 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (discussing the case of a New York inmate
involuntarily placed in close custody after he was stabbed by an inmate, and the case of a
New York inmate voluntarily placed in close custody after claiming she had been
assaulted by a correctional officer).
77. See Kerness, supra note 60.
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Even mentally ill inmates and nonviolent pretrial detainees79 have
been condemned to solitary confinement. Juveniles in adult
facilities," as well as juveniles in juvenile facilities awaiting pretrial
proceedings," have been held in isolation. Victims of prison rapes" or
attacks" have also been subject to the practice. Some immigration
detainees are even said to have been placed in solitary confinement
for acting as human rights monitors, who expose inhumane
conditions.' Many convicted terrorists are also housed in isolation."
The practice has even been extended to a disbarred lawyer found in
civil contempt of court," and has been used on some of the college
78. Some courts have prohibited mentally ill prisoners from being housed in certain
conditions of isolation. See, e.g., Perri v. Coughlin, No. 90-CV-1160, 1999 WL 395374
(N.D.N.Y. June 11, 1999); Langley v. Coughlin, 709 F. Supp. 482 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Jones
'El v. Berge, 164 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (W.D. Wis. 2001); Coleman v. Wilson, 912 F. Supp. 1282
(E.D. Cal. 1995); Ruiz v. Johnson, 154 F. Supp. 2d 975, 984-985 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
For more on the issue of housing the mentally ill in isolated conditions, see generally
Metzner & Fellner, supra note 39; see also Standards on Treatment of Prisoners, supra note
51 (which warns against placing inmates who are diagnosed with serious mental illness in
long-term segregated housing); see also Cruel and Unusual: US Solitary Confinement,
supra note 66 (mentioning that a significant number of persons held in solitary
confinement are the mentally ill who are "isolated for want of needed treatment"); Haney,
The Social Psychology of Isolation: Why Solitary Confinement Is Psychologically Harmful,
supra note 42, at 13-15; see also Landman v. Royster, 333.F. Supp. 621, 638 (E.D. Va.
1971); see also Langley, 709 F. Supp. 482 (observing that, in the Special Housing Unit,
mentally balanced inmates were housed with inmates who suffered from chronic mental
illness; further observing that inmates suffering from chronic mental illness and housed in
isolation were not given adequate medical attention); Jamie Fellner, Keep Mentally Ill Out
of Solitary Confinement, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (July 20, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/
news/2007/07/19/keep-mentally-ill-out-solitary-confinement.
79. See Cruel and Unusual: US Solitary Confinement, supra note 66 (noting that
Bradley Manning, the Unites States Army Private accused of leaking confidential military
documents to a press source, spent at least ten months in solitary confinement before even
being brought to trial).
80. Id. (reporting the plight of a fifteen-year-old pretrial detainee held in solitary
confinement at an adult facility for a two-year period); see also Jean Casella & James
Ridgeway, Alaska Teen Spends 17-Months in Pre-Trial Solitary Confinement (July 8,2010),
http://solitarywatch.com/2010/07/08/alaska-teen-spends-17-months-in-solitary-before-trial.
81. See James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, The Lonely Battle Against Solitary
Confinement, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 19, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR 1144094.
82. See Cruel and Usual: US Solitary Confinement, supra note 66.
83. See Williams v. Norris, 277 F. App'x 647 (8th Cir. 2008).
84. See Groups Call on Napolitano to Fix Conditions at Louisiana Immigration
Detention Facility, BIOTERRORISM WEEK, Aug. 17, 2009, available at 2009 WLNR
15752789.
85. See 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean Version of Hell, supra note 30 (discussing the
United States Penitentiary Administrative Maximum, which opened in Colorado in 1994).
86. Richard Fine's law license was revoked. Thereafter, as a defendant in an
unrelated proceeding, he was cast in judgment, but he failed to satisfy the judgment. He
students who participated in nonviolent Louisiana civil rights
protests, as well as on many of the Black Panther Party ("BPP")
members incarcerated for various offenses during their activist days.'
"Solitary confinement has been transmuted from an occasional
tool of discipline into a widespread form of preventive detention." 9
Of utmost concern is the practice of isolating inmates for
administrative or management reasons when an actual or imminent
threat to prison safety is not at issue, but a perceived one is. Some
wardens openly share their view that many inmates are isolated as a
result of "perception profiling." The warden of the prison where
1993 World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef is held explained his
decision to isolate him under the extremist conditions allowed at the
facility:
was placed in contempt for refusing to pay or provide a list of his assets. He was confined
for eighteen months. Prior to this, Mr. Fine had been outspoken about supplemental
benefit payments to Los Angeles County judges. See Jayne Ressler, Civil Contempt
Confinement Policies Should Be Reformed, DAILY NEWS (July 29, 2010),
http://www.dailynews.com/news/ci-15627000); see also Victoria Kim, Jailed L.A. Lawyer
Was Freed Because of "Irrational" Conduct, L.A. TIMES Sept. 21, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/sep/21/local/la-me-fine-20100921.
87. See D'ARMY BAILEY & ROGER EASSON, THE EDUCATION OF A BLACK
RADICAL: A SOUTHERN CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIVIST'S JOURNEY 1959-1964, at 98 (2009).
88. Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt was a high ranking member of the BPP. He spent
twenty-seven years in prison for a crime he did not commit. On his first day in prison, he
was placed in solitary confinement where he remained for eight years. See Christopher W.
Michaels, Geronimo Pratt and Inmate Records: Avoiding Injustice by Changing Inmate
Record-Keeping in New York State Prisons, 3 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 843, 851 (2010);
Winston Grady-Willis, Political Prisoners, in 2 BLACK PRISON MOVEMENTS USA: THE
NOBO JOURNAL OF AFRICANAMERICAN DIALOGUE 126, 132 (Africa World Press 1995)
(noting that Assata Shakur spent a significant amount of her incarceration in solitary
confinement); Id. at 132 (mentioning Dhoruba Bin Wahad, a former BPP member, spent
eight of his nineteen years in solitary confinement); Sundiata Acoli, A Brief History of The
New Afrikan Prison Struggle, in 2 BLACK PRISON MOVEMENTS USA: THE NOBO
JOURNAL OF AFRICANAMERICAN DIALOGUE 1 (Africa World Press 1995) (the author, a
former BPP member and a part of the Panther 21 case, reports spending a significant part
of his incarceration in solitary confinement at various facilities); see generally Jill Soffiyah
Elijah, Special International Tribunal on Human Rights Violations of Political Prisoners in
the United States Conditions of Confinement, in 2 BLACK PRISON MOVEMENTS USA: THE
NOBO JOURNAL OF AFRICANAMERICAN DIALOGUE 37 (Africa World Press 1995); see
CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, supra note 71, at 95 (indicating that George Jackson, a
BPP member, was held in maximum security); WARD CHURCHILL & JIM VANDER WALL,
THE COINTELPRO PAPERS: DOCUMENTS FROM THE FBI's SECRET WARS AGAINST
DISSENT IN THE UNITED STATES 147-148, 308 (2d ed. 2002) (referencing Bobby Seale, the
Panther 21, and Assata Shakur as being held in solitary confinement).
89. Colin Dayan, Barbarous Confinement, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/18/opinion/18dayan.html.
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He has that Charlie Manson look.... He just has the eyes. He
has some charisma about him. He's in uniform. But you know
that there's a powerful person that you're looking at.9
After this explanation, the warden responded in the affirmative
when asked, "[y]ou didn't want him in a place where he could give
anybody any orders."91
Analogously, the warden of Louisiana State Penitentiary (also
known as Angola),' through a deposition, offered this insight into the
Angola 3's prolonged stay in isolation:93
Q. Okay. What is it about Albert Woodfox that gives you such
concern?
A. The thing about him is that he wants to demonstrate. He
wants to organize. He wants to be defiant.
Q. Well, let me ask you this. Let's just for the sake of argument
assume, if you can, that he is not guilty of the murder of
[officer] Brent Miller.
A. Okay. I would still keep him in [solitary]. I still know he has
a propensity for violence. I still know that he is still trying to
practice Black Pantherism, and I still would not want him
walking around my prison because he would organize the young
new inmates. I would have me all kind of problems, more than
I could stand, and I would have the [whites]94 chasing after
them. I would have chaos and conflict, and I believe that. He
has to stay in a cell while he's at Angola.
90. See 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean Version of Hell, supra note 30.
91. Id.
92. See GEN. SERVS. ADMIN., HARD LABOR: HISTORY AND ARCHAEOLOGY AT THE
OLD LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, BATON ROUGE, LOUIsIANA 14 (1991)
(recognizing that Louisiana State Penitentiary sits on land that was once a plantation
named "Angola Plantation"); see also Wilbert Rideau & Billy Sinclair, Prisoner Litigation:
How It Began in Louisiana, 45 LA. L. REV. 1061, 1066 (1985) (stating that "Louisiana
State Penitentiary has always been known simply as 'Angola"').
93. INT'L COAL. TO FREE THE ANGOLA 3, A3 ANNUAL UPDATE 2 (Dec. 2008),
http://angola3.org/uploads/Annual%2OAppeal%2008.pdf. When the Angola 3 were
initially placed in isolation, C. Murray Henderson was the warden. See RIDEAU, supra
note 64, at 78.
94. Wilkerson v. Stalder, No. 00-304-RET-DLD, 2010 WL 1293375, at *1 n.1 (M.D.
La. Feb. 22, 2010) (noting that "Warden Cain later changed the word transcribed as
'blacks' to 'whites,' thus making the phrase read 'whites chasing after them"').
Q. Okay. And do you know whether his political views have
changed since that time?
A. That is what is scary to me.... [Ilt seems as though Albert
Woodfox and Herman Wallace is locked in time with that Black
Panther revolutionary actions they were doing way back when,
and that they're still hooked up to that. And that's still their
motive and that's still their goal. And from that, there's been
no rehabilitation. And even when Robert King Wilkerson
came with Congressman Conyers to Angola, he handed out
pralines. They gave me a little pack of pralines, Congressman
Conyers did, and on that pack of pralines was a Black Panther.
When questioned by Ojure Lutalo, a self-proclaimed anarchist
and member of the Black Liberation Army, as to why he was held in
isolation, prison officials made the following disclosure to him:
[C]oncern [continues] regarding .. . admitted affiliation with the
Black Liberation Army. Your radical views and ability to
influence others poses a threat to the orderly operation of this
institution.5
A California prison administrator recently expressed similar
housing fears during an interview concerning a hunger strike
organized by Pelican Bay State Prison inmates held in prolonged
isolation. She indicated that gang members held in solitary
confinement had organized the hunger strike that extended to
inmates who were not in isolation, as well as inmates housed at
facilities other than Pelican Bay State Prison. The fact that the
organizers could galvanize such support, in her view, "showed the
need to separate them from the general prison population."9 6 She
further remarked, "That so many inmates in other prisons throughout
the state are involved really demonstrates how these gangs can
influence other inmates, which is one of the reasons we have security
housing units in the first place."'
If the candidness of these disclosures has caused an involuntary
pause, know that there is good reason for these prison officials to
unveil themselves in such a way. They are acting in accordance with
the dictates of the United States Supreme Court, which has said that
95. See Kerness, supra note 60.
96. Ian Lovett, Hunger Strike by Inmates Is Latest Challenge to California's Prison
System, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/08/us/08hunger.html.
97. Id.
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isolating an inmate based on predictions of likely future behavior is
constitutional:
[P]rison administrators necessarily draw on more than the
specific facts surrounding a particular incident; instead, they
must consider the character of the inmates confined in the
institution, recent and longstanding relations between prisoners
and guards ... and the like. In the volatile atmosphere of a
prison, an inmate easily may constitute an unacceptable threat
to the safety of other prisoners and guards even if he himself
has committed no misconduct; rumor, reputation, and even
more imponderable factors may suffice to spark potentially
disastrous incidents. The judgment of prison officials in this
context, like that of those making parole decisions, turns largely
on "purely subjective evaluations and on predictions of future
behavior."9'
After being put in isolation, it is not unusual for an inmate to
remain in isolation for years. Some of the most acclaimed cases
include isolation for thirty-eight years," twenty-nine years,'? twenty-
eight years,"' twenty-two years,2 twenty years,'03 eighteen years,'4
98. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 474 (1983), abrogated in part on other grounds by
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995); see also Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000)
(rejecting the inmate's argument that his administrative segregation was based on
predictions of likely future behavior, but commenting that, were that the case, such would
be permissible); Gans v. Rozum, 267 F. App'x 178 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 844
(2008) (commenting that the inmate could be retained in administrative custody merely
because of his prior crimes).
99. The Angola 3 were placed in isolation in 1972. See Wilkerson v. Stalder, No. 00-
304-C, 2008 WL 5210696, at *1 (M.D. La. Dec. 12, 2008).
100. Robert King Wilkerson of the Angola 3 was placed in isolation in 1972. He was
released in 2001. See id. at *1 n.1; see also ROBERT HILLARY KING, FROM THE BOTTOM
OF THE HEAP: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF BLACK PANTHER ROBERT HILLARY KING 173
(2009).
101. While in custody for bank robbery, Thomas Silverstein was convicted of
murdering two African-American inmates and a correctional officer in different
incidences. He is also accused of having ties to the Aryan Brotherhood. See Silverstein v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Colo. 2010); WHITE PRISON GANGS,
http://whiteprisongangs.blogspot.com/2009/06/thomas-silverstein-14634-116.html
(last visited Dec. 3, 2011); Sara Burnett, Supermax Inmate Suing to Lessen Solitary
Confinement, DENVER POST, Apr. 29, 2011, http://www.denverpost.com/
fdcp?unique=1311218610694.
102. See Kerness, supra note 60.
103. See Mungin, supra note 68 (referencing some of the inmates in the California state
prison system).
104. See Laura Sullivan, Making It on the Outside, After Decades in Solitary, NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (July 28, 2006), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
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fifteen years,' 5 fourteen years,06 twelve years,' eleven years,'? ten
years,"' or five years.o "In many states, inmates held in solitary
confinement have almost no way out."". "Many stay in isolation until
their sentences run out.,," 2
While there are sound arguments in support of the practice of
prolonged isolation, some scholars have dismissed attempts to
legitimize the practice, positing the belief that isolation units exist for
illegitimate reasons. These scholars believe that the actual reasons
isolation units exist include for "social control against specific
prisoners,"" "to control revolutionary attitudes in the prison,"114 for
"breaking of the minds,""' and for "those perceived as troublemakers
Id=5589778 (reporting on Daud Tulam, who is said to have spent eighteen of twenty-five
years in isolation in New Jersey).
105. Raymond Luc Levasseur reports spending fifteen years in solitary confinement
during his eighteen years in federal prison after a conviction for a string of terrorist
bombings in the 1970s and early 1980s. See Abigail Curtis, Is Solitary Confinement
Torture? Lawmakers Will Consider Bill on What Some See As a Damaging Punishment,
BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 24, 2009, available at http://bangordailynews.com/
2009/10/23/politics/is-solitary-confinement-torture/.
106. See Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994 (8th Cir. 2011) (where an inmate was held,
for his own safety and protection, in administrative segregation after being attacked by
another inmate. Incidentally, his attacker spent fifty-six days in administrative segregation
as a result of the attack).
107. See Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1987) (where the inmate has
deemed an escape risk as a result of an escape many years prior).
108. Convicted terrorist Rami Yousef, the leader of the 1993 World Trade Center
attack, has spent in excess of eleven years in isolation. See 60 Minutes: Supermax: A Clean
Version of Hell, supra note 30 (discussing the United States Penitentiary Administrative
Maximum, which opened in Colorado in 1994).
109. Ray Colgrove, a Texas prisoner, has spent in excess of ten years in administrative
segregation. See Colgrove v. Williams, 105 F. App'x 537 (5th Cir. 2004). A Rastafarian
inmate who refused to cut his hair has spent at least ten years in isolation. See McRae v.
Johnson, 261 F. App'x 554 (4th Cit. 2008) (unreported). Troy Anderson, an inmate at the
all-solitary Colorado State Penitentiary, is said to have spent ten years in isolation due to
acting out on the symptoms of untreated mental illness, i.e., ADHD, bipolar disorder,
intermittent explosive disorder, anti-social personality disorder, cognitive disorders, a
seizure disorder, and polysubstance dependence. See Cruel and Unusual: US Solitary
Confinement, supra note 66.
110. Gawande, supra note 5 (referencing Bobby Dellelo, whom the author describes as
having spent five years of a life sentence in isolation at a Boston facility).
111. Sullivan, In U.S. Prisons, Thousands Spend Years in Isolation, supra note 28.
112. Id.
113. See Shaylor, supra note 22, at 400.
114. Id. at 398 (quoting Ralph Arons, former warden of the United States
Penitenitiary (USP) at Marion, Illinois).
115. See Kerness, supra note 60.
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or simply disliked by correctional officers, and, most of all, alleged
gang members."116
II. A Case Study: The Angola 3 Case
The case that has been termed the "Angola 3" case involves
three separate lives indelibly woven together by circumstance and
fused by inertia. From a prolonged isolation standpoint, this case is a
compelling prototype of what the United States Constitution does not
sanction. All three inmates spent the majority of their confinements
in closed cell restriction (also known as extended lockdown) at
Angola.117  An expert in corrections management has described the
Angola 3's stay in extended lockdown as "extraordinarily aberrant.'
Robert Hillary Wilkerson King, the first of the Angola 3, was
freed in 2001 after approximately twenty-nine years in extended
lockdown." 9 Mr. King was initially incarcerated in New Orleans after
being sentenced to thirty-five years for armed robbery. 120 After being
convicted of aggravated escape and aggravated battery, he was moved
to Angola.121 Mr. King began his stay at Angola around May of
1972.122 Two weeks later, he was placed in extended lockdown.123 Mr.
King reports being told that he was being put in isolation because he
116. See Dayan, supra note 89.
117. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:865 (2012) states: "No prisoner in the state
penitentiary shall be placed in solitary confinement, except in enforcing obedience to the
police regulations of the penitentiary."
Angola officials deny the existence of solitary confinement. See Liliana Segura,
Dispatch from Angola: Faith-Based Slavery in a Louisiana Prison, COLORLINES NEWS
FOR ACrION (Aug. 4, 2011), http://colorlines.com/archives/2011/08/dispatch-from_
angola-faith-based slavery-in-a-louisianaprison.html (quoting Assistant Warden Cathy
Fontenot, who acknowledged the existence of extended lockdown, but refutes the
existence of solitary confinement). Consistent with this point, a Louisiana court expressed
that closed-cell restriction is not the same as solitary confinement. See Wallace v. Teer,
527 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (La. Ct. App. 1988). In contrast, the Angola 3 expressed that
extended lockdown is the "effective equivalent of solitary confinement." See Wilkerson v.
Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d 654, 675 (M.D. La. 2007); see also supra note 9.
118. Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 672 (referencing the opinion of Steve J. Martin, an
expert retained by the Angola 3 in an Eighth Amendment action brought by them).
119. See KING, supra note 100, at 198-09.
120. See Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909, 910 (5th Cir. 1983).
121. Id.
122. See Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
123. See Maggio, 703 F.2d at 911 (noting that, at this time, the technical name for the
housing assignment was "Controlled Cell Reserve").
was under investigation regarding the death of correctional officerl24
Brent Miller, despite the fact that Mr. Miller was killed before he
arrived at Angola.125 In 1973, Mr. King was convicted of killing a
fellow inmate, and he remained in extended lockdown until his
conviction was overturned in early 2001 and he was released from
custody. 26
Herman Wallace, the second of the Angola 3, has been isolated
from the general population for approximately thirty-nine years.127
When he first arrived at Angola in 1969, he was classified as a
medium custody inmate and housed in the general population.'2 In
April of 1972, he underwent a custody change to extended lockdown
immediately following a prison riot that resulted in the death of
Officer Brent Miller.129 In 1974, Wallace was convicted of Officer
Miller's murder and sentenced to life in prison without parole,
probation, or suspension of sentence.o
Albert Woodfox, the third of the Angola 3, has likewise been
isolated from the general population for approximately thirty-nine
years.' When he first arrived at Angola in 1971, he was classified as
a medium custody inmate and housed in the general population.132 In
April of 1972, he underwent a custody change to extended lockdown
following the same prison riot that led to the death of Officer
Miller. '3  In 1973, Mr. Woodfox was convicted of killing Officer
124. All official documents refer to Brent Miller as a guard. This verbiage is not used
in this work because of the American Correctional Association's policy that the term
"correctional officer" be used instead of the term "guard." See Public Correctional Policy




60 (last visited June 27, 2011).
125. KING, supra note 101, at 173.
126. See Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 659; Wilkerson v. Cain, 233 F.3d 886 (5th Cir.
2000).
127. See Wilkerson v. Stalder, No. 00-304-C, 2008 WL 5210696, at *1 (M.D. La. Dec.
12, 2008).
128. See Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
129. Id.
130. See Commissioner's Report on Brady Claim Following Remand at 1, Wallace v.
State, No. 10-73-6820 (19th Dist. Nov. 7, 2006), http://www.angola3.org/uploads/Morgans-
Report.pdf.
131. See Stalder, 2008 WL 5210696, at *1.
132. See Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 659.
133. See id.
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Miller.'" For his offense, he was sentenced to a mandatory term of
life in prison without parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.
At the time of this conviction, he was serving a fifty-year sentence at
Angola for armed robbery.'
Extended lockdown conditions at Angola have been described
accordingly:
[They] remain[] alone in individual cells approximately 55 to 60
square feet for 23 hours of each day. During the other hour,
[they could] . . . shower and walk alone along the tier. . .. Three
times a week, [they could] ... instead choose to use this hour to
exercise alone in a fenced yard, if the weather permits.
The[y] ... also faced additional restrictions on privileges
generally available to inmates such as personal property,
reading materials, access to legal resources, work, and visitation
rights.... Each man's cell ha[d] an open front with bars, but
vision [was] restricted to what is directly in front of the cell door
by side walls. The cell [was] self-contained inasmuch as it ha[d]
a toilet, mattress, sheets, blanket, pillow, at least one storage
locker and sometimes two, and a small desk attached to the wall
which c[ould] be used for eating and for writing. A very small
window in the rear allow[ed] some natural light into the cell.'37
134. See State v. Woodfox, 291 So. 2d 388 (La. 1974).
135. See id. Along with Mr. Wallace and Mr. Woodfox, Chester Jackson and Gilbert
Montegut were accused of killing Officer Miller. Chester Jackson accepted a plea deal
and became a witness for the State. Gilbert Montegut was found guilty of a minor charge.
See Sullivan, Favors, Inconsistencies Taint Angola Murder Case, supra note 13.
136. Magistrate Judge's Report at n.1, Woodfox v. Cain, No. 06-789-D-M2 (M.D. La.
June 10, 2008), http://www.angola3.org/Uploads/Albert-%20Magistrate-Report.pdf.
137. Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 659-60. Arguably, Louisiana's "Minimum Standards
for Animal Shelters," requires better accommodations for shelter animals than the law
requires for solitary confinement cells. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:2464 (2012) states, in
pertinent part:
F. Facilities, indoor.
(2) Ventilation. Indoor housing facilities for dogs or cats shall be adequately
ventilated to provide for the health and comfort of the animals at all times. Such
facilities shall be provided with fresh air either by means of windows, doors,
vents, or air conditioning and shall be ventilated so as to minimize drafts, odors,
and moisture condensation. Auxiliary ventilation, such as exhaust fans and vents
of air conditioning, shall be provided when the ambient temperature is eighty-
five degrees Fahrenheit or higher.
(3) Lighting. Indoor housing facilities for dogs or cats shall have ample light, by
natural or artificial means, or both, of good quality and well distributed. Such
lighting shall provide uniformly distributed illumination of sufficient light
intensity to permit routine inspection and cleaning during the entire working
period. Primary enclosures shall be so placed as to protect the dogs and cats
from excessive illumination.
Gumbo is a famous part of Louisiana cuisine. It is soup made of
many ingredients and seasoned with special spices certain to
accentuate its palate-soothing goodness. The Angola 3 case is much
like a good bowl of gumbo; it is a mix of a lot of strange things. In
Mr. King's case, it has been established that his conviction (for killing
a fellow inmate) was the result of little more than fabrications."'
Many questions about the legitimacy of the convictions obtained in
Mr. Wallace's and Mr. Woodfox's cases (for the killing of Officer
Brent Miller) persist."' The Angola 3 case can never be fully
H. Primary enclosures for dogs and cats shall meet the following requirements:
(5) Primary enclosures shall be constructed and maintained so as to provide
sufficient space to allow each dog and cat to turn about freely and to easily stand,
sit, and lie in a comfortable, normal position.
(9) Primary enclosures for housing dogs shall provide a minimum floor space for
each dog equal to the mathematical square of the sum of the length of the dog in
inches, as measured from the tip of its nose to the base of its tail, plus six inches
expressed in square feet. This requirement shall be computed as follows: (length
of dog in inches plus six inches) times (length of dog in inches plus six inches)
divided by one hundred forty-four inches equals minimum square footage per
dog.
138. KING, supra note 100, at 188-199.
139. At present, Mr. Wallace and Mr. Woodfox each have two cases pending, the first
of which alleges their prolonged isolation violates the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments to the United States Constitution. May 2012 has been designated as the first
trial date. See Wilkerson v. Stalder, No. 00-0304 (La. filed Apr. 27, 2000). Additionally,
both men continue to challenge their convictions for the murder of Officer Miller. A
review of the case history compares to a tennis match between two robust contenders
where every victorious move is met with an even more victorious move causing the heads
of spectators to rotate rhythmically in observance of each play. Courts have found in
favor of Mr. Wallace and Mr. Woodfox; then, on appeal, courts have found in favor of
their opponents and the same pattern has continued over the years. See Stalder, 639 F.
Supp. 2d at 667; Woodfox v. Foti, No. 06-0789 (La. filed Oct. 11, 2006); Woodfox v. Cain,
609 F.3d 774 (5th Cir. 2010); Wallace v. Howard Prince, No. 03-09-1027 (La. filed Dec. 4,
2009).
This work does not visit the question of Mr. Wallace or Mr. Woodfox's culpability for
Officer Miller's murder and does not comment on the merits of any pending litigation
involving Mr. Wallace or Mr. Woodfox. This work is premised upon the view that the
finding of guilt is declarative unless and until reversed by a court of law. This work seeks
only to raise a necessary conversation about prolonged isolation. Notwithstanding this
fact, pertinent details about the criminal cases follow in the interest of underscoring the
complexities that have driven the custody assignments of Mr. Woodfox and Mr. Wallace
over the years.
Angola is located in the town of St. Francisville, which "advertises itself as plantation
country. It was also Klan country, and until the civil rights movement and the FBI arrived
[Vol. 39:4784 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Summer 2012] SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS & SOLITARY CONFINEMENT 785
in the early 1960s, no African American had registered to vote in the parish in more than
60 years." James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, Southern Injustice: Herman Wallace of the
Angola 3, PHILLYIMC (Jan. 4, 2010), http://www.phillyimc.org/en/southern-injustice-
herman-wallace-angola-3. After the murder of Brent Miller, emotions were high at
Angola. See ANNE BUTLER & C. MURRAY HENDERSON, DYING TO TELL: ANGOLA,
CRIME, CONSEQUENCE, CONCLUSION AT LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY 20-21
(1992). There was an ongoing internal power struggle. See id. at 23-25. There was also
pressure that resulted from court oversight. See id. at 25. For some, the murder served as
a foothold by which those hungry for power could attempt to dethrone those in power.
See id. at 158. Blame was generously distributed amongst inmates protecting their self-
interests, staff who felt the state failed the administration by not allocating sufficient
funding for correctional officers, and others who felt court pressure to afford due process
to inmates sent to isolation without hearings or any review process which may have caused
a certain administrator to unwisely release a mass number of violent inmates from
isolation only days before Mr. Miller's murder. See id. at 15-20. Staff was at war with
staff, and inmates were at odds with inmates. See id. at 158; see also Rideau & Sinclair,
supra note 93, at 1071 (noting that "[t]he criminal element of the inmate population made
their own power moves to isolate the militants, setting them up to be placed in lockdown
or having them stabbed during the period of emotional turbulence. Frequently, the
criminal and the security power-brokers worked hand-in-hand because they shared a
mutual interest of returning the prison to its normal, corrupt keel.").
"Wallace and Woodfox were convicted by all white juries in less than two hours." See
Sullivan, Favors, Inconsistencies Taint Angola Murder Case, supra note 13. In the case,
there were four primary witnesses at trial, all of whom were inmates. Hezekiah Brown, a
serial rapist serving a life sentence was one of those witnesses. During the first trial, he
swore under oath that he was not receiving any incentives for his testimony. That was
later revealed to be a lie. Not only did he receive a housing change from the dorm with
other inmates to an actual house on the property where a few inmates lived and trained
dogs for use in rescues, he also received a weekly carton of cigarettes and early release
(from a life sentence). See id. Proof surfaced that the warden assisted him with a pardon.
See IN THE LAND OF THE FREE (Mob Film Company, Gold Circle Films & UKTV's
Yesterday Films 2009), available at http://www.inthelandofthefreefilm.co.uk/index.aspx;
see also Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d at 782. The second of the four witnesses was legally
blind. See Sullivan, Favors, Inconsistencies Taint Angola Murder Case, supra note 13. The
third of the four witnesses was heavily medicated. See id. The final witness recanted and
stated that he implicated Mr. Wallace and Mr. Woodfox at the request of prison officials.
See id. In the original statement, the fourth witness said he observed Wallace burn his
bloody clothes in the incinerator. See id. No such incinerator ever existed. See id.
An inmate reported that someone besides Mr. Wallace and Mr. Woodfox confessed to
being the killer. See Laura Sullivan, Why Did Key Angola Witness Go to the "Dog Pen"?,
NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 29, 2008), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?
storyld=96255685. One inmate who says he was with Mr. Woodfox on the day in question
reports being placed in extended lockdown for twenty years after he told prison officials
that he was in the dining hall with Mr. Woodfox on the day of the murder and after he
testified to such. See id. Though a fingerprint was found next to the dead body of the
guard, it was never tested despite the fact that prison officials had prints of every inmate
on file. See id.
During the second trial, Anne Butler served as forewoman of the grand jury that
reindicted Mr. Wallace and Mr. Woodfox. See Sullivan, Favors, Inconsistencies Taint
Angola Murder Case, supra note 13. At the time, Ms. Butler lived in the prison
community. See id. Forging an even closer connection to the case, it is noted that Ms.
Butler is the former wife of Murray Henderson, the warden who led the Brent Miller
appreciated unless it is considered in its historical and geographical
context.
The setting for most of the Angola 3 case is Angola. By the
1970s, the affairs of Angola were subject to regular litigation.'40 By
1977, two courts had concluded that state and federal constitutional
violations were rampant in the facility. 141 The district court said that
conditions at Angola "shock the conscience of any right thinking
person."142  The appellate court remarked that "confinement. . . at
Angola [was] terrible."'43 Corrective action was ordered by the
district court and affirmed by the appellate court, but change would
come at a slow pace, much like life in south Louisiana.
Painfully coexisting with all of the other malignancies were racial
abettors. In the 1960s and 1970s, Angola was segregated.'" At this
point in time, segregation was the official pohCy, practice, and
custom of the state of Louisiana.146 "White and black inmates lived in
investigation. See id. Ms. Butler reportedly wrote a book about the case and circulated it
to fellow jurors. See id.; see generally BUTLER & HENDERSON, DYING TO TELL:
ANGOLA, CRIME, CONSEQUENCE, CONCLUSION AT LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
supra.
140. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 1971).
141. See Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206 (5th Cir. 1977) (where the appellate court
affirmed the district court's findings).
142. Id. at 1208.
143. Id at 1218.
144. See BUTLER & HENDERSON, DYING TO TELL: ANGOLA, CRIME,
CONSEQUENCE, CONCLUSION AT LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, supra note 139, at
4: Doing Time, and Doing Good, in Louisiana's Angola Prison, NAT'L PUB. RADIO, Apr.
26, 2011, available at 2010 WL 8626738; Segregated Prisons, NEWSDAY, Oct. 29, 1992,
available at 1992 WLNR 310956; Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 180 n.1 (1961)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (referencing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:752 (2012), which states:
"Segregation by race is required in prisons.").
145. See Garner, 368 U.S. at 180 (revealing segregation to be a state policy and "the
intention ... that such a policy be continued"); see generally RACHEL L. EMANUEL &
ALEXANDER P. TUREAUD, JR., A MORE NOBLE CAUSE: A. P. TUREAUD AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN LOUISIANA (2011).
146. See Garner, 368 U.S. at 180 n.1 (Douglas, J., concurring) (making reference to:
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:5 (2012) (required that all circuses, shows, and tent exhibitions
have segregated entrances); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:451 (2012) (required segregation at
social functions and sporting events); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:452 (2012) (required
separate seating arrangements and separate sanitary drinking water at public functions);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:79 (2012) (prohibited interracial marriages); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 17:10 (2012) (required that the blind be segregated); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
17:443, 17:462 (2012) (prohibited public school teachers from advocating desegregation);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:523 (2012) (prohibited state employees from advocating
desegregation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §H 45:528-532 (2012) (required segregation on
trains); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1301 (2012) (required separate waiting rooms on
carriers; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1303 (2012) (required separate toilets and separate
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separate dormitories, and while they ate in the same dining hall, a
wooden partition ran down the center of the huge facility, separating
their respective eating areas."1 47 "The prison itself was completely
and totally segregated; there were black camps and white camps,
black work lines and white work lines."l 48 African-American inmates
mostly performed outdoor farming jobs, while white inmates mostly
worked indoors as clerks.149 By the early 1970s, Angola did not have
any African-American employees.""o "Angola ... had the unfortunate
image of having a number of overtly racist employees, perhaps even
members of the Ku Klux Klan .. . ."' During this era, the Angola
administration has been described as being "overly conciliatory
towards the white inmates"15 2 and as showing "unrestrained contempt
for blacks."' Not until 1973, a year after the murder of Officer Brent
Miller, did the main complex at Angola become integrated.54
"During this time of civil-rights demonstrations, school
integrations, Vietnam War protests, and ghetto riots, the nation's
prisons, like the rest of the country, were marked by ferment and
turmoil."' 5 Life behind prison walls was not dull at this juncture in
history. In the 1970s, inmate litigation forced a change in
management philosophy and inmate conduct at Angola.'56 As with
any threatened loss of power, resistance surfaced. This coincided
with inmates bearing a "new psyche."' 7  "The social and political
unrest of the early 1970s that was common in the entire country
facilities for drinking water on common carriers); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:971 (2012)
(required employers to provide separate sanitary facilities); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:972
(2012) (required employers to provide separate eating facilities and separate eating and
drinking utensils); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:5066 (2012) (required segregated
neighborhood unless integration was approved by the majority of the other race); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:917 (2012) (required that the race of the parties in a divorce action
be made a part of the court docket); and LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4558.1 (2012)
(required that recreational facilities be segregated)).
147. Rideau & Sinclair, supra note 92, at 1068.
148. ANNE BUTLER & C. MURRAY HENDERSON, ANGOLA: LOUISIANA STATE
PENITENTIARY A HALF-CENTURY OF RAGE AND REFORM 127 (1990).
149. KING, supra note 100, at 138-39.
150. See BUTLER & HENDERSON, ANGOLA: LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY A
HALF-CENTURY OF RAGE AND REFORM, supra note 148, at 127.
151. Id.
152. KING, supra note 100, at 138-39.
153. Id.
154. See Rideau & Sinclair, supra note 92, at 1072.
155. BRANHAM & HAMDEN, supra note 3, at 465.
156. See Rideau & Sinclair, supra note 92, at 1066.
157. KING, supra note 100, at 171.
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added to the tension of an already hostile prison environment.",18
"Throughout the country, prisoners were organizing and demanding
their rights."' Prisoners were starting to be defiant instead of
subdued'6s-even outspoken and militant.16' Some prisoners were
planning uprisings.162 During this volatile point in history, Mr.
Woodfox and Mr. Wallace founded a prison chapter of the BBP at
Angola.63 Mr. Wilkerson later joined them in their campaign "for fair
treatment and better conditions for inmates; racial solidarity between
black and white inmates; and an end to the rape and sexual slavery
that was then endemic in the prison."
In a correctional setting, coalition building of any sort is frowned
upon. "Prison officials simply do not tolerate prisoners who organize
nonviolent protests."16  "Prison officials will inevitably become aware
of the organizing, and when they do, they immediately lockdown the
prison and conduct an investigation."'6  "Any prisoners who can be
identified as organizers will be sentenced to long terms in segregation
and transferred, usually to prisons in the federal system or in other
states."16  One might rightly note a similarity between the way prison
officials responded to activists and the way the government
responded during the COINTELPRO'" era of the late 1960s and
early 1970s. Perhaps the latter inspired the former.
158. Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 783 (5th Cir. 2010).
159. CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE
OF CRISIS 165 (1999).
160. See KING, supra note 100.
161. See BRANHAM & HAMDEN, supra note 3, at 465.
162. See Elie v. Henderson, 340 F. Supp. 958 (E.D. La. 1972).
163. See AMNESTY INT'L, USA: 100 YEARS IN SOLITARY: THE "ANGOLA 3" AND
THEIR FIGHT FOR JUSTICE 8 (June 2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/
asset/AMR51/041/2011/en/1373c247-9955-41c4-a87a-db89ael6ld5f/amr51041201len.pdf;
KING, supra note 100, at 171 (Author Robert Hillary King Wilkerson attributes the
formation of the Angola prison chapter to fellow inmates Albert Woodfox, Herman
Wallace, and Ronald Ailsworth.).
164. AMNESTY INT'L, USA: 100 YEARS IN SOLITARY: THE "ANGOLA 3" AND THEIR
FIGHT FOR JUSTICE, supra note 163, at 8.
165. See Arkles, supra note 73, at 352.
166. Id. at 351.
167. Id. at 351-52.
168. COINTELPRO, a counterintelligence program, had as its purpose the following:
"[T]o expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black
nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen,
membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil
disorder." See Memorandum from the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to "Personal
Attention to All Offices," captioned "Counterintelligence Program Black Nationalist-
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III. Legal Concerns Viewed Through the Lens of the
Angola 3 Case
A. Due Process Considerations
1. Overview of Due Process Protections
Due process "is an idea that assumes the existence of conflicts
between the government and citizens and the resolution of those
conflicts through lawful proceedings.""' The United States
Constitution guarantees due process protections under both the Fifth
and the Fourteenth Amendments. "The Fifth Amendment applies to
federal action; the Fourteenth Amendment to state action.,,170 The
Due Process Clause has been interpreted as having a substantive
component and a procedural aspect."' Substantive due process
questions if there is a constitutional right that can be protected.172
"The ... substantive component 'provides heightened protection
against government interference with certain fundamental rights and
Hate Groups Internal Security" (Aug. 25, 1967), http://vault.fbi.gov/cointel-pro/cointel-
pro-black-extremists/cointelpro-black-extremists-part-01-of/view. During the era at issue,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation's official response to groups it viewed as subversive to
the government was neutralization. Much like the thinking of some prison administrators,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) felt that "dissident speech and association
should be prevented because they were incipient steps toward the possible ultimate
commission of an act which might be criminal." S. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, S. REP.
NO. 94-755, at 27 (1976). In essence, the FBI also engaged in "perception profiling."
During this era, the FBI showed no regard for constitutionally protected rights. See id. at
28. The FBI's widely cast net included the silencing of people for that which the law
allowed. The secret strategy employed by the FBI was highly organized and very
methodical. "The unexpressed major premise of the program was that a law enforcement
agency has the duty to do whatever necessary to combat perceived threats to the existing
social and political order." Id. at 3. While bearing an official name and official
governmental support, COINTELPRO was little more than government sanctioned
harassment. See Memorandum from the Fed. Bureau of Investigation to the Fed. Bureau
of Investigation Director, captioned "Buairtel to Albany" (Apr. 3, 1968) (on file with
author) (associating counterintelligence techniques with harassment). Under the
COINTELPRO program "[p]articular emphasis" was given to leaders of the BPP. See
Memorandum from Fed. Bureau of Investigation to "Personal Attention to All Offices,"
captioned "Counterintelligence Program Black Nationalist-Hate Groups Internal
Security," supra. By 1968, FBI agents were given instructions to submit "imaginative and
hard-hitting counterintelligence measures aimed at crippling the BPP." S. REP. NO. 94-
755, at 22.
169. Charles Miller, The Forest of Due Process of Law: The American Constitutional
Tradition, in DUE PROCESS 3 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
170. JOHN W. PALMER, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 108 (2d ed. 1977).
171. See id.
172. See id.
liberty interests."'173 "The procedural aspect of due process deals with
the procedures or means by which government action can affect the
fundamental rights of the individual; it is the guarantee that only after
certain fair procedures are followed can the government affect an
individual's fundamental rights."1 4 "The Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause protects persons against deprivations of life,
liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its procedural
protection must establish that one of these interests is at stake."'7 If a
liberty interest is at issue, then the procedural protections of the Due
Process Clause attach.76
173. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (1997)).
174. PALMER, supra note 170.
175. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221 (2005).
176. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 475-78 (1983), employed a method for identifying
state-created liberty interests that emphasized the language of a particular prison
regulation. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) changed this approach. The Sandin
Court decided it was better to look to the nature of the deprivation.
The Sandin Court tackled the question of whether an inmate has a liberty interest in
remaining free from the punishment imposed and set the legal standard that must be met
when deciding if a liberty interest exists. In Sandin, an inmate filed a section 1983 action
alleging a violation of his procedural due process rights after a prison disciplinary
committee denied his request to present witnesses at a disciplinary hearing. The Supreme
Court reversed the lower court's decision, finding error in the practice of analyzing the
actual language of state prison regulations rather than considering the nature of the
deprivation or restraint itself. The Court observed that the former "encouraged prisoners
to comb regulations in search of mandatory language on which to base entitlements to
various state-conferred privileges." Id. at 482. The Court then held that a liberty interest,
and hence a right to the protection of procedural due process, can arise in two situations:
(1) When an inmate is placed in a "restraint which, while not exceeding the sentence in
such an unexpected manner as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its
own force... nonetheless imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in
relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life"; and (2) a liberty interest is involved when
the punishment includes action which necessarily affects the duration of a prisoner's
sentence. Id. at 484-87. The court offered that the following factors dictate what
constitutes an "atypical and significant" hardship:
(1) the effect of disciplinary action on the length of prison confinement;
(2) the extent to which the conditions of the disciplinary segregation differ from other
routine prison conditions; and
(3) the duration of the disciplinary segregation imposed compared to discretionary
confinement.
In the end, the Sandin Court held that the inmate's thirty days of disciplinary
segregation did not implicate a liberty interest because the conditions of disciplinary
segregation were closely akin to the conditions outside of disciplinary confinement.
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2. The Process Due an Inmate Subject to Prolonged Isolation
The scope of this discussion is limited to what "process" is due
after an inmate has been submitted to solitary confinement for a
period longer than four months.'77  "When prolonged isolation is at
issue, a liberty issue has been found to be at stake.17 ' As such, a
177. In some instances, a "process" is due an inmate before an assignment to
segregation is made. When considering the process due an inmate before an assignment to
segregation is made, it is important to distinguish between disciplinary segregation and
nondisciplinary segregation (i.e., administrative, protective, investigatory, or discretionary
segregation). Disciplinary segregation takes place for a specific time period, unlike
administrative segregation, which is not considered punishment and, as such, may continue
until the threat is over.
Nondisciplinary Segregation
Inmates have no liberty interest in avoiding transfer to nondisciplinary segregation
because there is nothing "atypical" about discretionary segregation; discretionary
segregation is instead an "ordinary incident of prison life" that inmates should expect to
experience during their time in prison. For this reason, a very minimal process is due.
When prison officials initially determine whether a prisoner is to be segregated for
nondisciplinary reasons, due process requires that they hold an informal, nonadversary
hearing within a reasonable time after the prisoner is segregated, inform the prisoner of
the charges against him or the reasons segregation is being considered, and allow the
prisoner to present his views. See Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 476. Due process also requires that
there be an evidentiary basis for the prison officials' decision to place an inmate in
segregation for administrative reasons, and due process warrants periodic reviews. See id.
at 475-78.
Disciplinary Segregation
Disciplinary segregation requires more of a process than nondisciplinary segregation. A
formal hearing is required. In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563-69 (1974), the
Supreme Court established certain minimum requirements for procedural due process in
an inmate's disciplinary hearing: (1) That the inmate be given written notice of the charges
against him no less than twenty-four hours in advance of the hearing; (2) that the
factfinder at the hearing provide a written statement setting forth the evidence relied on
and reasons for the disciplinary action; and (3) that the inmate be allowed to call witnesses
and present documentary evidence in his defense, as long as doing so is not unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.
178. Sandin, 515 U.S. 472 speaks to the existence of a liberty interest when a
disciplinary proceeding is at issue. Some jurisdictions have extended Sandin to
nondisciplinary proceedings and others have refused. See, e.g., Maclean v. Secor, 876 F.
Supp. 695, 701-02 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding regulations limiting prison officials' discretion
in administrative detention decisions created a liberty interest); McClary v. Kelly, 4 F.
Supp. 2d 195 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (applying Sandin where an inmate was held in
nondisciplinary segregation for approximately five years and concluding that a liberty
interest existed).
Unfortunately, "[j]udicial perceptions of liberty interests cannot be predicated with any
confidence or reduced to a logical model." NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. ET AL.,
ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION OF PRISONERS: DUE PROCESS ISSUES 13 (1979). There
is no definitive explanation of how many years one must remain in isolation before a
liberty interest is created. These cases help to illustrate this point.
A liberty instance has been found to exist in the following instances: Wilkinson, 545
U.S. 209 (where the Supreme Court held that inmates at a state supermax facility
possessed a liberty interest based on the extreme conditions of their confinement, the
indefinite duration of their placement, and the fact that transfer to the facility
automatically disqualified an otherwise eligible inmate for parole consideration); Colon v.
Howard, 215 F.3d 227 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding 305 days in disciplinary isolation an atypical
and significant hardship sufficient to implicate a liberty interest); Clark v. Brewer, 776
F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that approximately seven years in nondisciplinary
isolation gave rise to a liberty interest, which was created by application of the official
corrections policy at issue); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 2000) (ruling that eight
years in administrative segregation is atypical in relation to the ordinary incidents of
prison life); Gans v. Rozum, 267 F. App'x 178 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 844
(2008) (finding, because of the length of time in administrative isolation (eleven years), a
liberty interest exists); Sheley v. Dugger, 833 F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding a liberty
interest, because of the language in the state regulations, where an inmate had been held
in isolation for twelve years for administrative reasons); Williams v. Norris, 277 F. App'x
647 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that twelve years in administrative segregation constituted an
atypical and significant hardship in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life); Bowen
v. Ryan, 248 F. App'x 302 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding twenty years in nondisciplinary isolation
an atypical and significant hardship sufficient to implicate a liberty interest); Silverstein v.
Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 704 F. Supp. 2d 1077 (D. Colo. 2010) (finding, because of the
extreme conditions of isolation, a liberty interest where an inmate had been held in
isolation for twenty-seven years).
Conversely, no liberty interest was found in these cases: Sandin, 515 U.S. 472 (finding
that thirty days in disciplinary isolation did not present the type of atypical, significant
deprivation that would trigger due process protections largely because the time in isolation
was subsequently expunged from the inmate's disciplinary record and because the
inmate's conditions in isolation were not radically different from inmates in administrative
custody or segregation); Marino v. Klages, 973 F. Supp. 275 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that
three hundred actual days spent in disciplinary isolation did not present the type of
atypical, significant deprivation that would trigger due process protections); Magluta v.
Samples, No. Civ.A. 1:94CV2700-TWT, 2006 WL 1071844 (N.D. Ga. Apr. 20, 2006)
(holding that a pretrial detainee held in nondisciplinary solitary confinement for more than
five hundred days did not have a liberty interest); Riley v. Carroll, 200 F. App'x 157 (3d
Cir. 2006) (holding that nondisciplinary custody for fifteen months was not an atypical and
significant hardship).
There are particular challenges to consider when fashioning a definite line of
demarcation concerning what constitutes an "atypical and significant hardship":
I therefore fully understand Judge Newman's desire to provide an across-the-
board resolution of these fact-intensive disputes by fixing a specific duration of
normal SHU confinement that triggers procedural due process. But, as a
jurisprudential matter, I cannot agree to a solution that amounts to judicial
legislation, particularly when the 180-day bright line that Judge Newman
proposes is not the line implicated in the case presently before us.
The bright-line solution proposed by Judge Newman is not arrived at by
adjudication but by legislative fiat. As judges, we are uniquely charged with
interpreting the law and applying it on a case-by-case basis. This mandate, with
its attendant limitations, derives from the Constitution's "case and controversy"
requirement in Article III, and proscribes us from deciding "ill-defined
controversies over constitutional issues, or a case which is of a hypothetical or
abstract character." [T]he judiciary "is entitled to decide constitutional issues
only when the facts of a particular case require their resolution for a just
adjudication on the merits."
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"process" is "due" to the inmate. The "process" "due" an inmate
after he is placed in isolation consists of periodic reviews to determine
if the inmate should remain in isolation."' This is true of inmates
subject to non-disciplinary segregation (i.e., administrative or
discretionary), as well as inmates subject to disciplinary segregation."
Judges are not legislators. Legislators are democratically accountable; federal
judges are unelected and hold the office permanently. Legislators can gather
facts to decide policy questions; judges are confined to the record of the case at
hand. Legislation is usually the result of political and pragmatic compromises,
and drawing sometimes arbitrary lines is part of what legislators do. Our task is
different. Our task is not to dispense rough or approximate justice in future
cases but to apply general legal principles to specific cases as they come before
us. . .. While, of course, we are mindful of a rule's likely future consequences,
any rule we announce must be justified as necessary to its present application.
When a judge reaches beyond the facts of the case at hand, there is an increased
likelihood that the judge's imagination will fail adequately to contemplate the
effects of the ruling on future litigation. That judges sometimes arrive at a
bright-line rule does not justify our reaching for it independently of the process
of adjudication.
Colon, 215 F.3d at 235-236 (Walker, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
179. The periodic-review requirement stems from Hewitt, 459 U.S. 460, abrogated in
part on other grounds by Sandin, 515 U.S. 472. In Hewitt, the Supreme Court stated,
"administrative segregation may not be used as a pretext for indefinite confinement of an
inmate. Prison officials must engage in some sort of periodic review of the confinement of
such inmates." Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 477 n.9; see also COMM'N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN
AMERICA'S PRISONS, supra note 57 at, 55; NAT'L ASS'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. ET AL.,
supra note 178, at 29 (observing that "officials must periodically review the need for
continuing an inmate's segregated confinement"); Gans, 267 F. App'x 178 (noting that due
process was satisfied in the case of an inmate subject to eleven years in administrative
custody by the extension of periodic reviews); McClary, 4 F. Supp. 2d at 212 (indicating
that inmates subject to administrative segregation must still be afforded procedural
safeguards); Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding where an inmate is
held in administrative segregation indefinitely or for a prolonged time, "due process
requires periodic review in a meaningful way and by relevant standards to determine
whether he should be retained in segregation or returned to population"); Bono v. Saxbe,
620 F.2d 609, 614 (1980) (the court held, in an administrative segregation, that since the
district court had ordered periodic review, indefinite confinement did not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment); Gibson v. Lynch, 652 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1981) (Gibson, who had
committed no infraction, who was not a disciplinary or risk prisoner, and who needed no
protection for his own well-being, was incarcerated in a type of confinement normally
associated with prisoners who are under disciplinary sanction or who require protection
due to a cell shortage. The court observed that if a prisoner is a severe risk case, due
process requires periodic review). In the case of disciplinary detention, the American
Correctional Association requires accredited facilities to have a documented review
process and to conduct thirty-day reviews to determine if the reasons for the placement
still exist. See AM. CORR. ASS'N, supra note 56, at 55 (referencing standard #4-4255);
Hoffer v. Comm'r of Corr., 589 N.E.2d 1231 (Mass. 1992) (where an inmate was held in
disciplinary segregation for over two years, the institution was obligated to conduct
meaningful segregation status reviews).
180. E.g., Hoffer, 589 N.E.2d 1231; see also 28 C.F.R. § 541.26(c) (2012) (requiring
thirty-day reviews of federal inmates held in administrative or disciplinary segregation).
No entity or regulatory body has delineated with specificity what an
adequate or meaningful post-isolation review hearing is in the
confines of a prolonged isolation situation, however."' And courts
have refused to engage in an explicit conversation along these lines.
The absence of any specific guidance is largely to blame for the legal
quandary at issue herein. By deduction, a few principles can be
congealed in an effort to appreciate what minimal attributes must
exist for these reviews to be considered constitutionally firm.
3. A "Meaningful" "Process" As Envisioned by the Due Process Clause
As an initial point for determining what makes for a
constitutionally sound proceeding, the Supreme Court instructs that
"the process due in any given instance is determined by weighing the
private interest that will be affected by the official action against the
Government's asserted interest and the burdens the Government
would face in providing greater process."1 82 Second to this, "[flidelity
to the ideals of due process shows ... [a] deep commitment to the
values of fair play and fair treatment. . .. "183 "Fairness and
impartiality are realized if the hearing is oriented towards fact-
finding, defined as the disinterested determination of an inmate's
innocence or guilt, and the provision of a meaningful opportunity to
present a defense." 5
"Due process ... will be most effective where there exist
reasonably clear, generally understood standards for exercise of the
181. Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10th Cir. 2011), does define what a meaningful
review is in the confines of Colorado's Quality of Life Level Program, which is a stratified
incentive program. The author finds this authority distinguishable. The Toevs program
has six levels and the conditions at each stage do not involve extreme isolation. At each
level, an inmate's privileges are increased. Levels one, two, and three are administrative.
The Toevs court defined a meaningful review when one is in nondisciplinary segregation
as the following: "[O]ne that evaluates the prisoner's current circumstances and future
prospects, and, considering the reason(s) for his confinement to segregation, determines,
without preconception, whether that placement remains warranted." Id. at 758. In the
author's view, for due process purposes, there is a difference in this Colorado program and
the general practice of prolonged isolation discussed in the article, that being the fact that
Colorado's program has a minimum length of enrollment, is designed with the opportunity
for an inmate to earn his way out, and does not involve extreme isolation for the duration
of the program or on an indefinite basis.
182. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
183. See David Resnick, Due Process and Procedural Justice, in DUE PROCESS 218 (J.
Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1977).
184. Donald F. Tibbs, Peeking Behind the Iron Curtain: How Law "Works" Behind
Prison Walls, 16 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 137, 172 (2006).
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authority in question, standards which can serve as the background
for public justification and defense of decisions."'8  "As the relevant
standards ... become less and less clear, the constraints on the
decision maker in a due process proceeding become progressively
weaker, and the power of these decision makers itself comes to seem
more and more arbitrary."'" For a due process hearing to serve its
constitutional function, "the procedures followed should be ones that
take the complainants' objections seriously and place them on a par
with the claims of authority.""7 It is sufficient if a "finding is made on
the basis of a showing which meets a specified burden of proof.""
The review should not necessarily require that prison officials permit
the submission of any additional evidence or statements.'" "The
decision whether a prisoner remains a security risk should be based
on facts relating to a particular prisoner ... and on the officials'
general knowledge of prison conditions and tensions, which are
singularly unsuited for 'proof' in any highly structured manner."' 9
"And if the relevant circumstances truly have not changed, the fact
that the review form says nothing different will not preclude a review
from being considered meaningful.".' "But the review must be
meaningful; it cannot be a sham or a pretext." "
A review of cases reveals great disparity in how these principles
have been applied in different jurisdictions. One court reasoned that
the "determination of whether an inmate is to be retained in
segregation or returned to population is not so much a question of
what he has done in the past but of what he is likely to do or have
done to him in the future if he is returned to population."'9 ' This
court seems to have taken a very liberal stance where an evidentiary
standard is concerned; perhaps because of the accepted view that
"[p]rison authorities' ability to act to prevent violence and disruption
should not be limited to situations of certainty or probability."' 94 A
185. See T. M. Scanlon, Due Process, in DUE PROCESS 99 (J. Roland Pennock & John
W. Chapman eds., 1977).
186. See id.
187. See id.
188. NAT'L Ass'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. ET AL., supra note 178, at 40.
189. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983).
190. Id.
191. Toevs v. Reid, 646 F.3d 752 (10thCir. 2011).
192. Id. at 758.
193. Finney v. Hutto, 410 F. Supp. 251, 279-80 (E.D. Ark. 1976), aff'd, 548 F.2d 740
(8th Cir. 1977), aff'd, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
194. NAT'L ASs'N OF ATTORNEYS GEN. ET AL., supra note 179.
different case offers a very different perspective into what it takes to
satisfy an evidentiary standard. In this case involving two inmates
convicted of killing two correctional officers, the court advised that "a
prison warden may not constitutionally put an inmate in
administrative segregation, involving solitary confinement or other
rigorous conditions of imprisonment, simply because he dislikes the
inmate or desires to punish him for past misconduct."' 9 ' This court
warned that "the reason or reasons for the segregation must not only
be valid at the outset but must continue to subsist during the period
of the segregation."'9 According to this court's reasoning, the
absence of such would amount to a finding with no evidentiary
support. Lastly, this court noted that a warden may not consider the
killing of a correctional officer a preponderant guideline in deciding if
the inmate could be returned to the general population." In another
case involving an inmate held in isolation for fourteen years and with
no disciplinary infractions over a fourteen-year period, prison
officials, relying on an unflattering past conduct record, continued
denying his release at review hearings, but failed to explain to the
inmate, with any reasonable specificity, why he constituted a
continuing threat to the security and good order of the institution. In
concluding that his review hearings were not meaningful, the court
commented:
[W]e do not think it permissible for the Warden to give artificial
weight to the convictions or to consider them as determining or
preponderant guidelines in deciding whether ... [an inmate]
can safely be returned to population. [Warden] Harmon ...
consistently testified at trial that seven-years' worth of clean
history was irrelevant to him, and Ass't Warden Moncrief
confirmed that, even if [the inmate] proved to be "the perfect
model citizen" or "model prisoner," his vote as Ass't Warden
would always be that [he] remain in Ad. Seg. in light of his past
transgressions. This is precisely the type of undue weight
accorded to past facts that we explicitly forb[id] .... 198
Interestingly and by way of useful analogy, courts hearing parole
cases have held that a due process violation occurs when parole is
195. See Kelly v. Brewer, 525 F.2d 394, 400 (8th Cir. 1975).
196. See id.
197. See id. at 402.
198. Williams v. Hobbs, 662 F.3d 994, 1008 (8th Cir. 2011).
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denied solely because of the violent nature of the original offense.'"
These courts have found that the process does not satisfy the "some
evidence" standard required in due process proceedings, where there
is no reliable evidence in the record to support the conclusion
reached.2m Of the evidentiary threshold, one court has said:
[C]ontinued reliance upon the unchanging facts of petitioner's
crime makes a sham of California's parole system and amounts
to an arbitrary denial of petitioner's liberty interest. Petitioner
had been denied parole on six occasions prior to the
determination he now challenges. Continued reliance upon the
unchanging characterization of petitioner's offense amounts to
converting petitioner's sentence of seventeen years to life to a
term of life without the possibility of parole.20'
Thereafter, the court referenced a revealing rhetorical
conversation:
[W]hat is it about the circumstances of petitioner's crime or
motivation which are going to change? The answer is nothing.
The circumstances of the crimes will always be what they were,
and petitioner's motive for committing them will always be
trivial. Petitioner has no hope for ever obtaining parole except
perhaps that a panel in the future will arbitrarily hold that the
circumstances were not that serious or the motive was more
than trivial. Given that no one seriously contends lack of
seriousness or lack of triviality at the present time, the potential
for parole in this case is remote to the point of non-existence.
Petitioner's liberty interest should not be determined by such
an arbitrary, remote possibility.20
As a result of there being no exact standards governing periodic
review hearings, review hearings are in many instances nothing more
than ritualistic exercises in formality.203 Often, the proceedings are
199. See Rosenkrantz v. Marshall, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1063 (C.D. Cal. 2006); see also
Cerny v Cal. Bd. of Prison Terms, No. EDCV 05-1090-R (AJW), 2010 WL 2605965 (C.D.
Cal. Apr. 15, 2010).
200. Rosenkrantz, 444 F. Supp. 2d 1063; Cerny, 2010 WL 2605965.
201. Rosenkrantz, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 1081-82.
202. Id. at 1082 (citing Irons v. Warden of Cal. State Prison-Solano, 358 F. Supp. 2d
936, 947 (E.D. Cal. 2005).
203. See COMM'N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA'S PRISONS, supra note 57, at
55; Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 115 (2008); Robert M. Ferrier, "An Atypical and Significant Hardship": The Supermax
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
hollow in that they do not genuinely probe into the suitability of an
inmate's custody change, and they do not rule based on a measurable
evidentiary standard. Many review hearings serve as veils for a
predetermined decision to maintain an inmate in isolation on an
indefinite or permanent basis. Further complicating the situation is
the fact that judicial challenges to such proceedings may fall upon
deaf ears because courts, concerned only with procedure and satisfied
with the knowledge that a "process" was afforded, feel their work is
done.20 This article strongly asserts that this does not comport with
due process. Because inmates have no constitutional right to release
from prolonged isolation,205 it is imperative they be afforded a just
process when they are evaluated at periodic intervals. The Angola 3
case is a powerfully instructive example of why these due process
protections are so abundantly important.
4. Due Process Viewed Through the Lens of the Angola 3 Case
The Angola 3 case forces even a jaundiced eye to see how
perfunctory the periodic review process can be. A look at the
evidence in the Angola 3 case shows that Mr. Wilkerson's "conduct
report, encompassing a time period from 1972 through his 2001
release, reflects a single act of violence for fighting in 1986."206 "Since
they were placed in isolation, Mr. Wallace and Mr. Woodfox 'each
have one disciplinary infraction related to violence' and '[e]ach of
these incidents occurred over twenty years ago."' 2' The warden
described Mr. Wallace's and Mr. Woodfox's conduct during their
Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on Status-A Plea for Procedural Due
Process, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 291 (2004).
204. See Burnett, supra note 102 (concerning Thomas Silverstein, said to have been
held in solitary confinement longer than any other federal prisoner); Gans v. Rozum, 267
F. App'x 178 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 844 (2008); Bowen v. Ryan, 248 F.
App'x 302 (3d Cir. 2007); Estate of DiMarco v. Wyo. Dep't of Corr., 473 F.3d 1334 (10th
Cir. 2007); Rodgers v. Johnson, 56 F. App'x 633 (6th Cir. 2002); McMann v. Gundy, 39 F.
App'x 208 (6th Cir. 2002); Shoats v. Horn, 213 F.3d 140, 147 (2000); Sheley v. Dugger, 833
F.2d 1420 (11th Cir. 1987); Clark v. Brewer, 776 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985).
205. See Clark, 776 F.2d at 236; see also Silverstein v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 1077, 1095 (D. Colo. 2010).
206. Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d 654,660 (M.D. La. 2007).
207. Memorandum in Opposition to Re-Urged Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing All Eighth Amendment Claims at 37, Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d 654 (No. 00-304-
C); Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 667 (finding that Mr. Woodfox and Mr. Wallace, "now in
their 60's do not, and have not for some time, presented a threat to 'the safety, security
and good order of the facility.' They have had no serious disciplinary incidents in
decades....").
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time in isolation as "good," 20 8 and he agreed to Mr. Woodfox being
described as a model prisoner. During periods when the men were
transferred to other facilities outside of Angola for proceedings, they
functioned well and without incident in the populations they
temporarily existed in. 210  The numerous cellblock review boards,
charged with the task of reviewing Mr. Wallace's and Mr. Woodfox's
statuses, have all expressed that Mr. Wallace and Mr. Woodfox are
not physically dangerous to others.211 These reviews also classify them
as not being an escape risk.212 Their mental health records are also
insightful. Prison social workers opine that neither man poses a
danger to others.213
Despite all of this, "for three-and-a-half decades, every warden
who has run the prison has stamped the same papers keeping them in
solitary every 90 days." 214  As to the reason for their continued
isolation, their lockdown review summaries indicate it is "nature of
original reason for lockdown." 215 Under the policy in place when the
Angola 3 were placed in solitary confinement, it was permissible for
prison officials to consider the original reason for the isolation as the
208. Memorandum in Opposition to Re-Urged Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing All Eighth Amendment Claims, supra note 207, at 38 (quoting deposition
testimony given by Warden Burl Cain).
209. See Woodfox v. Cain, No. 06-789-JJB, 2008 WL 5095995, at *3 n.37 (M.D. La.
Nov. 25,2008).
210. See Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d at 660-61.
211. See Memorandum in Opposition to Re-Urged Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing All Eighth Amendment Claims, supra note 207, at 38 (quoting deposition
testimony given by Warden Burl Cain); In re Albert Woodfox Doc #72148 (Louisiana
State Penitentiary) (Lockdown Review Summary, 2000-2005) (on file with author); In re
Herman Wallace Doc #76759 (Louisiana State Penitentiary) (Lockdown Review
Summary, 1998-2007) (on file with author).
212. See Memorandum in Opposition to Re-Urged Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing All Eighth Amendment Claims, supra note 207, at 38 (quoting deposition
testimony given by Warden Burl Cain); In re Albert Woodfox Doc #72148, supra note 211;
In re Herman Wallace Doc #76759, supra note 211.
213. See Memorandum in Opposition to Re-Urged Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing All Eighth Amendment Claims, supra note 207, at 40.
214. See "Angola 2" Leave Solitary Cells in Louisiana After 36 Years, NAT'L PUB.
RADIO, Mar. 27, 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=89140779.
215. See Memorandum in Opposition to Re-Urged Motion for Summary Judgment
Dismissing All Eighth Amendment Claims, supra note 207, at 38 (quoting deposition
testimony given by Warden Burl Cain); Ridgeway & Casella, Southern Injustice: Herman
Wallace of the Angola 3, supra note 139; In re Albert Woodfox Doc #72148, supra note
211; In re Herman Wallace Doc #76759, supra note 211.
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board reviewed an inmate for release.216 In 1996, the policy changed
and this language was removed.217 Despite this, the post-1996 reviews
still show "nature of original reason for lockdown" as the reason for
the men's continued isolation. In the way of official reasons for the
Angola 3's prolonged isolation, prison officials offer that they
"present[] a serious threat to the safety of the staff, other inmates, the
general public, and a threat to the safety, security, and good order of
the facility."218 The current warden has also expressed fears that Mr.
Woodfox is a "predator,"21 9 who is "not rehabilitated." 2 0
The Angola 3 case highlights a number of shortcomings in the
periodic review process, the first being how critical a meaningful
evidentiary standard is to the process. Had prison officials been
required to respect an evidentiary standard that required them to
show that the isolated housing assignment was connected to a
legitimate penological objective, could the Angola 3's isolation have
continued indefinitely? If the Angola 3 were security concerns in the
1970s, could officials, when confronted with a legitimate evidentiary
standard, establish they are still security concerns? The next lesson to
be learned from the Angola 3 case is that it is inherently unfair to
deprive inmates of most programmatic opportunities, but expect
them to somehow demonstrate that they are entitled to release from
isolation. If a person is held in isolation and is thereby deprived of
programmatic opportunities for growth and interaction, how can such
an inmate show himself to be reformed?
Another insight to be gained from the review process afforded
the Angola 3 is the impact of not having a neutral and detached party
as part of the process. Albert Woodfox opines that his isolation is the
result of the warden's discomfort with his political beliefs, and he
insists that his isolation does not further any legitimate penalogical
objective.22 1 Without the involvement of detached parties, how can
his complaints be placed on par with those of prison officials? If
216. See Wilkerson v. Stalder, 639 F. Supp. 2d 654, 668 (M.D. La. 2007) (reporting that
"LSP Policy Directive 18.002, in 1995, included a statement that 'the original reason for
assignment will play a large role in the board's decision [whether or not to continue
lockdown]'. However, that statement was removed from Policy Directive 18.002 in 1996,
and currently is not present.").
217. See id.
218. Id. at 660.
219. See Woodfox v. Cain, No. 06-789-JJB, 2008 WL 5095995, at *3 n.38 (M.D. La.
Nov. 25, 2008).
220. See id.
221. See id. at *4.
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prison officials erroneously concluded that all BPP involvement is
bad, and overlooked the fact that the BPP could serve as a unifying
and empowering organization and could, therefore, have value in an
institutional setting, how could prison officials be enlightened? 222 If
the Angola 3 were wrongfully convicted of Officer Miller's murder,
and are guilty of being no more than activists, how can they
successfully demonstrate during the existing review process that they
are victims of perception profiling? If the Angola 3 did commit a
prison murder in the 1970s, but they are now in their criminal
menopause and will no longer act violently, how might they make
such a showing under the current system? If the Angola 3 are distant
or indirect victims of COINTELPRO, will they ever be able to mount
222. The BPP "made extensive inroads in the southern battle ground of the 1960s civil
rights struggle." Charles E. Jones, Foreword to ORISSA AREND, SHOWDOWN IN DESIRE:
THE BLACK PANTHERS TAKE A STAND IN NEW ORLEANS xi, xiii (2009). The BPP
operated community centers, a free breakfast program, free health clinics, free busing to
prison programs, sickle-cell anemia testing centers, and voter registration programs. See
Curtis J. Austin, Introduction to ORISSA AREND, SHOWDOWN IN DESIRE: THE BLACK
PANTHERS TAKE A STAND IN NEW ORLEANS xvii, xvii (2009). BPP member Bobby Rush
described the inner workings of the BPP accordingly:
[Tihe Panthers organized poor people, primarily blacks, into a structure to
correct problems such as housing and education. The[] [BPP] had no military
wing.... [T]he ordinary Panther day-rising at 5:30 A.M. to go to one of the six
Breakfast for Children sites to prepare and serve breakfast to the kids and then
clean up. Members would spend their days selling Panther papers, soliciting
contributions, including food for the breakfast program, or working in the office.
They would eat a communal dinner at Panther headquarters and often have
political education classes afterward. For most members, it was a full-time job.
The party provided money for food and rent from contributions and speaking
honoraria. Friendly doctors provided free medical care.
JEFFREY HAAS, THE ASSASSINATION OF FRED HAMPTON: How THE FBI AND THE
CHICAGO POLICE MURDERED A BLACK PANTHER 283-84 (2010).
Because of their many positive contributions, many saw the BPP as "not [being]
racists... [but as being] staunch, fearless protectors of the poor, the abused, the
disenfranchised and the helpless." ORISSA AREND, SHOWDOWN IN DESIRE: THE BLACK
PANTHERS TAKE A STAND IN NEW ORLEANS 97 (2009) (citing an interview given in 2002
by Father Jerome LeDoux, an African-American priest who was instrumental in diffusing
a shootout between the New Orleans Police Department and the New Orleans Chapter of
the BPP in 1970). To others, the Black Panthers were violent and dangerous. This was
partly because they bore arms. See Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1263
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (According to the Panthers, party members were not required to carry or
train with firearms, but they were encouraged to do so because of "harassment by law
enforcement."). And this was partly because they "made no claim to pacifist piety and did
not care whether displays of aggression would alienate white supporters." AREND, supra,
at 186. The BPP "employed direct defiance of authority, shocking young people out of
political fatalism by demonstrating that black salvation lay in black people themselves and
not in laws or white largesse." Id. at 186.
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such a defense? 23 A constitutionally sound review process would
account for these things; a perfunctory one would not.
The shortcomings exposed in the Angola 3 case are not limited
to just the Angola 3. The Angola 3 case is representative of a practice
taking place nationally. Mr. Woodfox has stated, "No matter how
well we behave, we don't have a way to get out of solitary." 224 There
is an uncomfortable degree of truth in this statement. With the
shortcomings identified, it is conceivable that any inmate could be
subject to the same fate as the Angola 3. This is said because the
hearings entirely mute the voice of the inmate, as well as recycle
arbitrary decisions that have no evidentiary nexus. This means any
inmate can be trapped in the solitary confinement system with no way
out. Under the current state of affairs, little is required to place a
prisoner in isolation. And once a prisoner is placed in solitary
confinement, the absence of a reason to remove the prisoner is
considered reason enough to keep him there.
B. Separation of Powers Concerns
Our Constitution vests all legislative Powers in Congress,225 the
executive Power in the President,226 and the judicial Power in the
Supreme Court and such "inferior Courts as Congress may from time
to time ordain and establish." 227  "Under 'the basic concept of
separation of powers ... that flow[s] from the scheme of a tripartite
government' adopted in the Constitution, 'the "judicial Power of the
United States" .. . can no more be shared' with another branch than
'the Chief Executive, for example, can share with the Judiciary the
veto power, or the Congress share with the Judiciary the power to
override a Presidential veto."' 22 8 In establishing the system of divided
power in the Constitution, the Framers considered it essential that
"the judiciary remain[ ] truly distinct from both the legislature and
the executive." 29 On this point, it has been said that "there is no
223. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209 (2005).
224. See Interview by Kari Lydersen with Albert Woodfox, in Angola, La. (Mar. 30,
2007), available at http://news.infoshop.org/article.php?story=2007angola3.
225. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
226. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
227. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
228. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011) (citing United States v. Nixon, 418
U.S. 683, 704 (1974)).
229. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608 (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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liberty if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative
and executive powers." 230
"In light of '[t]he impossibility that one man should be able to
perform all the great business of the State,' the Constitution provides
for executive officers to 'assist the supreme Magistrate in discharging
the duties of his trust."' 231 Corrections administrators serve in this
capacity. As an extension of the executive, corrections administrators
may not, according to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, encroach
upon the powers of the legislative or judicial branches of government.
By design, a warden plays a very different role in the life of an inmate
than does a sentencing judge, whose primary function it is to impose
sentences.232 A sentencing judge has authority to remand a defendant
to the custody of the corrections department. In most instances, a
sentencing judge has no authority over how or where a defendant
spends his time in custody.233 Once a defendant is taken into custody,
230. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608.
231. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3146
(2010).
232. GEORGE COLE & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 29 (8th ed. 1998).
233. For an illustration of this principle, see Young, supra note 72 (observing that court
orders requiring that convicted defendants spend the first six months of their respective
sentences in solitary confinement could not be enforced); see also State v. Yirga, No. 16-
01-24, 2002 WL 1299860, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. June 4, 2002) (striking down the portion of
a sentence requiring the defendant to spend time in solitary confinement and noting that
the authority to define and fix punishment belongs exclusively to the legislature); U.S. v.
Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2000) (wherein the court stated: "[N]othing in the
federal law authorizes a judge to sentence a prisoner to life in the control unit"); United
States v. Corozzo, 256 F.R.D. 398 (E.D.N.Y. 2009), presents a rare instance where a court
might have limited authority to dictate the conditions of confinement. At issue was a
request by the prosecutor that the sentencing judge issue an order barring the defendant, a
convicted mafia captain and killer, from associating or communicating with any member
or associate of organized crime during his incarceration and supervised release. Id. at 399.
Many of the defendant's family members were or are members or associates of organized
crime families. Id. at 400. The provision the prosecutor relied on reads, in pertinent part:
The court, in imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment upon a defendant
convicted of a felony set forth in chapter 95 (racketeering) or 96 (racketeer
influenced and corrupt organizations) of this title or in the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), or at any time
thereafter upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons or a United
States attorney, may include as a part of the sentence an order that requires that
the defendant not associate or communicate with a specified person, other than
his attorney, upon a showing of probable cause to believe that association or
communication with such person is for the purpose of enabling the defendant to
control, manage, direct, finance, or otherwise participate in an illegal enterprise.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(d) (2012) (emphasis added).
Corozzo, 256 F.R.D. at 400-01. The defense argued that imposition of such an order
would have the practical result of imposing solitary confinement. Id. at 401. After
his relationship with prison officials and administrators begin. What
is important is the delineation of power between the two officials.
Judges are not equipped with prison administrative authority and
wardens are not equipped with sentencing authority.
"It is the obligation of penitentiary officials to insure that
inmates are not subjected to any punishment beyond that which is
necessary for the orderly administration of (the prison)."2 3 When
prison officials impose pretextual and/or extreme and prolonged
disciplinary or administrative measures that are not absolutely
necessary for prison security purposes or genuinely connected to
legitimate penological concerns, the prison official leaves the realm of
discipline and enters the realm of sentencing/resentencing. In doing
so, prison officials not only abuse their authority, but they assume
authority they lack.
The Doctrine of Separation of Powers is so sacred to this nation
that it was even upheld in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a case against a man
suspected of being an enemy combatant." Hamdi complained about
being held over a year in a detention facility despite not having been
charged with an offense. He also complained about not being
afforded any type of judicial proceeding. Even for Hamdi, the
Supreme Court insisted that the executive respect the functions of the
judiciary. The Court refused the executive's argument that it was
entitled to great latitude in the instance of national security. National
security or not, the Court expressed that one branch may not exceed
its authority by assuming the role of the next branch. Of significance
to the Court was the fact that there was a judicial vehicle in place to
address the executive's concern about the suspected combatant: a
treason charge. As the court cautiously observed, a criminal charge
would have broken the government's monopoly on the accused. The
Court strongly spoke against the government's view that a heavily
circumscribed role for the courts was appropriate given the nature of
the accusations against the accused.236 To this, the Court remarked
that such an approach would "serve only to condense power into a
single branch of government." 237
expressing concerns over the mental health risks posed by extended periods of isolation,
the court held: "Assuming the order the government seeks in this case is constitutional,
the court elects not to exercise its discretion to issue it." Id at 402.
234. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1214 (5th Cir. 1977) (citing Gates v. Collier,
501 F.2d 1291, 1309 (5th Cir. 1974)).
235. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004).
236. See id.
237. See id.
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C. Separation of Powers Through the Lens of the Angola 3 Case
By way of example, one might consider the fictitious case of an
individual (hereinafter referred to as inmate #1) sentenced by the
courts to a thirty-nine year prison term. At the time of sentencing, it
was the intention of the court that inmate #1, less predictable
penological occurrences, would emerge from confinement in a state
comparable to, better than, or proportionally inferior to the one he
entered in. Inmate #1, subject to all the medical, social, and
emotional challenges that incarceration imposes, would likely emerge
from prison alive. Inmate #1 has a very good chance of leaving prison
better socialized and able to reintegrate with skills likely to ensure his
success upon release. Compare, now, the Angola 3, assuming them to
have been of like health and age as inmate #1 at the beginning of the
thirty-nine year term. Consider that the Angola 3 have spent the vast
majority of their confinement in prolonged isolation. The fate of the
Angola 3 would likely be very different than inmate #1. The Angola
3 would arguably have an increased risk of death during his period of
confinement due to the many adverse health effects of solitary
confinement. If they survive, the Angola 3 would have an increased
risk of serious mental or emotional illness as a result of the prolonged
confinement experience. The Angola 3 would also have less of an
opportunity to reintegrate into society because the Angola 3 would
have been afforded no institutional opportunity to gain a skill, be
educated, or pursue a trade, or for refinement of social skills or for
spiritual edification. In effect, inmate #1 did the time he was
sentenced to, whereas the Angola 3 received far more than the
sentencing judge intended. In the case of the Angola 3, the warden
can be said to have changed the sentence imposed by the court
because a non-death sentence is, in effect, commuted to a possible
death sentence; yet a warden lacks sentencing power.
Even conceding that death could befall any inmate due to natural
or environmental circumstances, the impetus for death is significant
to this dialogue. Deaths induced by prison officials speak to the use
of power on the part of officials serving as agents of the executive
branch. This implicates constitutional concerns not raised when an
inmate's death is induced naturally or as a result of the ordinary
prison environment. When prison officials impose or expedite death
or decline, they claim power that the Constitution does not grant
them; they obliterate the line of demarcation between the judiciary
and the executive branch. Hamdi reminds us that the Separation of
Powers Doctrine cannot be selectively applied. It is equally
applicable to enemy combatants, convicts, and the like. The Angola 3
case forces one to assess this notion.
D. Judicial Abstinence & the Potential for Abuses
In the 1900s, courts adopted what has become known as the
"hands-off doctrine."" "Under this doctrine, courts refused to
adjudicate prisoners' constitutional claims ... because .. . the courts
felt that they generally had neither the duty nor the power to define
and protect those rights." 23 9 "Another reason . .. for the lack of court
intervention in prison policy [is] the federalist principle that certain
aspects of state government should not be interfered with by the
federal government."240 The idea that prisoners have rights that the
courts are bound to protect ... was finally accepted by courts in the
1960s and 1970s. 241 Nonetheless, "vestiges of the 'hands-off doctrine'
remain."242 Currently, there exists "a policy of minimum intrusion
into the affairs of state prison administration" 243 and a belief that state
"prison officials ... be vested with broad discretion. . .. With
respect to inmate periodic review hearings, this often results in courts
limiting their involvement to ensuring that inmates are afforded the
process to which they are entitled. Often, courts will not evaluate or
241
engage in a meaningful review of the process' substance.
238. See BRANHAM & HAMDEN, supra note 3, at 463.
239. Id.
240. MCSHANE, supra note 15, at 200.
241. BRANHAM & HAMDEN, supra note 3, at 464.
242. Id. at 469.
243. Williams v. Edwards, 547 F.2d 1206, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1977); see also Turner v.
Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85 (1987) (indicating that "separation of powers concerns counsel a
policy of judicial restraint" where prison adminitstion is concerned). As recent as this
year, this longstanding principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court:
Courts must be sensitive to the State's interest in punishment, deterrence, and
rehabilitation, as well as the need for deference to experienced and expert prison
administrators faced with the difficult and dangerous task of housing large
numbers of convicted criminals ... Courts nevertheless must not shrink from
their obligation to "enforce the constitutional rights of all 'persons,' including
prisoners.".. . Courts may not allow constitutional violations to continue simply
because a remedy would involve intrusion into the realm of prison
administration.
Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928-29 (2011) (citations omitted).
244. Edwards, 547 F.2d at 1212-13; see also People v. Cole, 926 N.Y.S.2d 163, 164
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
245. This point is illustrated in Ferguson v. Cain, No. 2009 CA 2017, 2010 WL 1838895,
at *1-2 (La. Ct. App. May 7, 2010) (wherein a Louisiana inmate, in 2008, sought review of
a decision maintaining him in extended lockdown since 2007. The appellate court noted
that the screening protocol required a screening officer to reject any administrative
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To appreciate the harm that results from this, one might
analogize prison management to household management. In a family
unit, it is imperative that parents be given freedom and latitude to
raise their children. Society gives tremendous deference to parents
because they know the frailties, propensities, and vulnerabilities of
their children in a way that most others could not. Unless the
judgment of the parent endangers the child, courts abstain from
drawing interferences regarding parental decision-making.246 If the
daily decisions of parents were subject to review by courts,
procreation would likely be halted and courts would no longer be
able to meet their daily demands. Because parents know exactly
where legal lines are drawn and know that they will be held
accountable for transgressions, this paradigm works for society. In
the prison model, the warden, like parents, must also have wide
latitude when it comes to disciplinary and management decisions. In
the case of prisons, it would be a burden to the courts if every
judgment of a prison administrator were subject to substantive
review. As is with parenting, no one would want to serve as a prison
administrator if they knew constant legal entanglement was a hazard
of the job. This, however, is where the similarities end.
Unlike parents, prison officials do not know with certainty that
they will be held accountable for their transgressions. In fact, one
might argue that, in the prison setting, courts have created a layer of
immunity for prison officials, by refusing to scrutinize penal decision-
making during the periodic review process. What is needed is a firm
legal line much like the one that exists for parents. The legal line
should memorialize the crossing point into too far. The challenge lies
in stopping courts from enabling transgressions by prison officials
with their silence, while at the same time ensuring that the courts are
complaint regarding a lockdown review board decision, unless the inmate alleges that the
board gave no reasons for a decision or failed to conduct a review every ninety days.
Because the inmate did not allege that the board gave no reasons for its decision or failed
to conduct a review every ninety days, the appellate court concluded that the decision
denying his petition for judicial review was proper); see also Gans v. Rozum, No. 06-62J,
2007 WL 2571527, at *3 n.1, *7 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 31, 2007) (refusing to entertain an inmate's
plea that he was being held in prolonged isolation as a result of incorrect allegations that
he was a sexual predator. Because there was no showing that the review process was
constitutionally inaccurate, the court declined involvement).
246. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) (wherein the Supreme Court
expressed that "so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children ... there will
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of the family to
further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the
rearing of that parent's children").
not put in the position of having to micromanage prison officials. On
this point, the Supreme Court has warned: "an unchecked system of
detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and
abuse of others."247 One could argue the Angola 3 represent how
abstinence by courts (insofar as substantive review of the merits of
periodic review decisions is concerned) has allowed prison officials to
act with impunity.
E. Judicial Abstinence Viewed Through the Lens of the Angola 3 Case
In 1983, Robert Wilkerson King complained to the court that the
lockdown review board's review of his case was a "mere sham."2 48
The court noted the fact that the lockdown review board met every
ninety days as required under Louisiana's administrative regulations
and performed only a cursory review of King's case before concluding
that the board's decision to maintain his maximum security
classification was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. No attention
was paid to the threat Mr. King posed at that point in time to the
legitimacy of the administratively produced record of past conduct, or
to the institution's compliance with an evidentiary standard.
In 1988, Herman Wallace unsuccessfully sought, in the state
court system, his release from extended lockdown. 249 The court
placed great weight on the administrative regulation governing when
a prisoner can be put in extended lockdown. The regulation allowed
a custody change to extended lockdown when an inmate was a danger
to himself or others, an escape risk, in need of protection, a threat to
security, or the subject of an internal investigation. 250  The court
concluded that this regulation was based on standards as opposed to
unfettered discretion. Thereafter, the court explained that "[d]ue
process requires only that prison officials 'engage in an 'informal,
nonadversary review' of the evidence surrounding an inmate's
restrictive confinement, and that the inmate received 'some notice of
the charges against him and an opportunity to present his views to the
prison official . . .. ""2 According to the court, due process did not
require the opportunity to present evidence, other than a prisoner's
252own statement, or to call witnesses.
247. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 530 (2004).
248. See Wilkerson v. Maggio, 703 F.2d 909, 911 (1983).
249. See Wallace v. Teer, 527 So. 2d 1061, 1062 (La. Ct. App. 1988).
250. See id. at 1063.
251. Id. (citation omitted).
252. Id.
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After a cursory review, this court also reached the conclusion
that due process requirements were met because Mr. Wallace was
given a full hearing with the right to present evidence and to
subpoena and cross-examine witnesses, including the review panel, in
a juridical-type atmosphere before an independent hearing officer.
Additionally, the court noted that the findings of the hearing officer
were subject to review by the district court and the appellate court.
No attention was ever given to the difficulties an inmate faces in
trying to mount a defense when access to programs and/or
interactions with others is virtually nonexistent. Nor did the court
address the reliability of the administratively produced record of past
conduct, nor the institution's compliance with an evidentiary
standard. If courts reviewed substantively and past the superficial to
ensure an evidentiary standard was met during the periodic review
process, would Mr. Woodfox and Mr. Wallace remain in isolation?
IV. Reform Proposal:
Legislative Model for the Periodic Review Process
There is a need for practical, as well as philosophical, changes on
the part of penal institutions, legislative bodies, and courts. These
changes would best be undertaken in the form of a legislative model,
offering a national framework. A legislative model, such as this, is
amenable to modifications, as dictated by the needs and/or
shortcomings of the specific jurisdiction. Ideally, such a model would
be adopted in substance by jurisdictions across the United States. At
the very least, it is hoped, this proposed legislation will be used as a
springboard for the discussion of necessary policy changes.
Conceding that prison officials must have liberal charge of an
institution, this authority needs to be somewhat less absolute than it
currently is. A lack of accountability or oversight corrupts as much as
it serves to ratify innocent errors in judgment. The major reform
advanced herein is that institutions should no longer have complete
authority over decisions regarding inmates' exoduses from solitary
confinement. As an alternative, a tiered approach should be
implemented, whereby prison officials make the initial decision to
place a prisoner in isolation and retain authority over the first
periodic review, but where, thereafter, other eyes begin to watch,
other ears begin to listen, and other minds begin to ponder the fate of
the isolated inmate. This reform is consistent with the aspirations of
the Supreme Court, which expressed that, in both civil and criminal
proceedings, due process requires an "adjudicator who is not in [the]
situation."25 In furtherance of this view, the Court has explained that
"[e]ven an appeal and a trial de novo will not cure a failure to provide
a neutral and detached adjudicator." 25 4 Another significant proposed
reform is that the process be regulated by actual legislation and not
by the administrative rule-making process.255 The proposed model
follows:
1. Preliminary Considerations
This model is intended to have both prospective and
retroactive application.
This model assumes all players will be trained and
informed, as a minimum, on the unique intricacies of penal
institutions, solitary confinement, and due process.
253. Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S.
Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993).
254. Id. at 618.
255. Statutes take priority over regulations because it is legislative bodies that
empower agencies to create their regulations, and legislatures can remove or modify that
power as well. Because of the potency of legislation, it, as opposed to agency rulemaking,
is advocated. This point has been addressed:
[T]he making of rules by an administrative agency pursuant to legislatively
delegated rule-making power differs from "legislation" or "law-making" in two
essential aspects. First, the source of the power to make the rule is in the
Legislature. Second, the concept of "legislation," in its essential sense, is the
power to speak on any subject without any specified limitations.
Westervelt v. Natural Res. Comm'n, 263 N.W.2d 564, 576 (Mich. 1978).
Exemplifying this concern is a finding by a New York court that prison officials were
not complying with the administrative regulations they enacted. Despite such a finding on
the part of the court, the court was uneasy about fashioning a resolution:
The court emphasizes that its holding is only that the DOC must comply with
Minimum Standard § 1-05. It is not for the court to weigh correctional policies,
to select among different possible means for providing services to close custody
inmates outside their cells, or otherwise to supervise the manner in which the
Commissioner effects compliance with this Minimum Standard. The manner in
which compliance with the Minimum Standard is to be effected implicates the
security of the prison facility and the safety of prisoners and staff, matters that
are within the expertise of the Commissioner, and will remain subject to his
judgment and exercise of discretion.
In re Jackson, 895 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (citations omitted).
256. Valuable as a juxtaposition is Louisiana legislation enumerating standards for
animal shelters. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:2463(E) (2012) states:
Shelter personnel should be trained as to animal health, disease control, humane
care and treatment, animal control and transportation of animals. Shelter
workers shall be fundamentally humane, shall be able to identify and understand
the principal animal diseases and injuries, and should have good judgment and
even temperament.
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2. Placement into Solitary Confinement
Prison officials should maintain exclusive control over the
process employed to place an inmate into solitary
confinement.
Prison officials should maintain exclusive control over the
periodic review process until completion of the first review.
When being placed in solitary confinement, prisoners
should know the reason for the placement... and the
duration of their sentence to solitary confinement, and
should be provided with a case plan enumerating exactly
what must be done to earn their exodus.258
Placement in solitary confinement as a result of perceptions
that are not incident to actual actions or specific, actual,
and legitimate security or penological concerns should be
prohibited. Continued placement in solitary confinement
based on dated security concerns should not be allowed. 25 9
Prolonged solitary confinement should be abolished.
However, the practice of reassigning an inmate to solitary
257. This is consistent with Section 4(b) of the Model Act suggested by the American
Civil Liberties Union, which reads as follows: "Any time a prisoner is classified, assigned
or subject to long-term isolation, there must be a stated, legitimate purpose for such
placement in writing." MODEL ACT: IMPROVING PUBLIC SAFETY, PROTECTING
VULNERABLE POPULATIONS & ENSURING PROCESS IN IMPOSING LONG-TERM
ISOLATED CONFINEMENT 6 (Am. Civil Liberties Union 2011), available at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/prison/model-stop-solitary-act_-_7-11.pdf.
258. This is consistent with Section 4(d) of the Model Act suggested by the American
Civil Liberties Union, which reads:
Determinate sentencing to long-term isolation shall not be allowed. The
Department shall institute a program that allows a prisoner subject to long-term
isolation to earn his/her way out of such housing through positive behavior. The
trajectory for prisoners to earn their way out of such housing shall be graduated
and must be less than one year/six months.
Id. at 8.
259. This is consistent with Section 4(b) of the Model Act suggested by the American
Civil Liberties Union, which reads:
A prisoner may only be subject to long-term isolated confinement if he or she is
determined... to have committed one or more of the following acts while
incarcerated within the preceding five years:
i. An act of violence that either: (1) resulted in or was likely to result in
serious injury or death to another, or (2) occurred in connection with any
act of non-consensual sex;
ii. Two or more discrete acts which caused serious disruption of prison
operations;
iii. An escape, attempted escape, or conspiracy to escape from within a
security perimeter or custody, or both.
Id. at 6.
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confinement for a defined time, following an adverse
review, should be allowed.
Once in solitary confinement, inmates must have a means
of defending their interests at review proceedings. They
must have access to some programs and services so
reformation can be established during the review process.260
3. Periodic Reviews
Reviews should be conducted at regular intervals. Four
months is the recommendation.261
Burden of Proof: At every stage of the review process, the
prison should bear the burden of showing: (1) That the case
plan could be accomplished; and (2) how the inmate failed
to satisfy the case plan.262
260. This is consistent with Section 4(a) of the Model Act suggested by the American
Civil Liberties Union, which reads:
[S]uch prisoners shall be offered access to educational and programming
opportunities consistent with the prisoners' safety and security and any federal
and state law requirements; at least four hours a day of out-of-cell time, including
a minimum of one-hour of out-of-cell daily exercise that includes access to
outdoor recreation when the weather permits; access to personal property,
including TVs and radios; access to books, magazines, and other printed material;
access to daily showers; and access to the same number.
Id.
261. See supra note 9. This recommendation is made with knowledge of the fact that
many jurisdictions require ninety day reviews and with knowledge of the fact that such is
the recommendation of the ABA. Because of the number of people to serve on the
special review board and because such service is uncompensated, a slightly longer period is
suggested to minimize burden on board members. Also, it is the author's view that a four-
month period affords an inmate a greater opportunity to comply with the case plan. As
well, the author feels this is consistent with Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 477 n.9 (1983),
where the Supreme Court said periodic reviews were required, but failed to prescribe how
often.
262. This suggestion is compatible with a recent Supreme Court pronouncement. In
articulating what type of process was due to the accused who had not yet been charged
with a crime, the Court explained:
[O]nce the Government puts forth credible evidence that the habeas petitioner
meets the enemy-combatant criteria, the onus could shift to the petitioner to
rebut that evidence with more persuasive evidence that he falls outside the
criteria. A burden-shifting scheme of this sort would meet the goal of ensuring
that the errant tourist, embedded journalist, or local aid worker has a chance to
prove military error while giving due regard to the Executive once it has put
forth meaningful support for its conclusion that the detainee is in fact an enemy
combatant.... [Plrocess of this sort would sufficiently address the "risk of an
erroneous deprivation" of a detainee's liberty interest while eliminating certain
procedures that have questionable additional value in light of the burden on the
Government.
Later, the court offered additional insight:
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After completion of the first review, prison officials should
no longer retain exclusive control over the review process.
The initial review should be conducted by prison officials.
If the decision is unfavorable, a seven-member special
review board should be empanelled for all future reviews.
The seven-member special review board264 should be
comprised of:
One ethicist or member of the clergy (to serve as
Chair).265
Because we conclude that due process demands some system for a citizen-
detainee to refute his classification, the proposed "some evidence" standard is
inadequate. Any process in which the Executive's factual assertions go wholly
unchallenged or are simply presumed correct without any opportunity for the
alleged combatant to demonstrate otherwise falls constitutionally short.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534-37 (2004).
263. This suggestion is compatible with the Supreme Court's pronouncement in
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533-35 (wherein the Court specifically indicated that a process was not
due in every instance. According to the Court, no process was due when suspected
combatants were initially captured in the battlefield. Process, according to the Court, was
due only when a suspected combatant would be held continuously).
Consistent with this suggestion, it is worth noting that British authorities, after
abandoning its practice of routine use of solitary confinement as a form of discipline, set
up an independent body of inspectors to track results and effect adjustments to its new
system. See Gawande, supra note 4.
A worthwhile comparison can be found in Louisiana legislation governing removal of
animals from stables. Under LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3:2435 (2012), animals found to be
unsuitable shall not be returned to stables until their release is approved by the humane
society officer. If the animal's owner disagrees with the determination of the humane
society officer, a veterinarian must be called in. If this does not resolve the owner's
concern, a disinterested, experienced person shall be called in to render a final opinion.
What is suggested for note is the fact that, in the case of an animal, one person's opinion is
not acceptable. The process is designed to involve several opinions and multiple reviews
by detached parties.
264. The review board is recommended because due process requires a "neutral and
detached judge." See Concrete Pipe and Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1992). Due process also requires an "independent
tribunal," "a basic system of independent review," "a neutral decision maker," or an
"impartial adjudicator." See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534-36.
This recommendation is consistent with the ABA's Standards on Treatment of Prisoners.
Recommendation 23-2.9(a)(ii) calls for "decision-making by a specialized classification
committee that includes a qualified mental health care professional." See Standards on
Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 51.
As a fiscally conservative measure, thoughts of utilizing a parole board were considered.
Feeling a parole board would lack the neutrality and objectivity envisioned, this idea was
dismissed.
265. These professionals were selected because it is anticipated that they will (1) bring
a general sense of balance and integrity to the process; and (2) act as effective mediators at
the onset of impassioned disagreements.
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One mental health professional or a social worker.
261
One prisoner advocate or an exonerated person.
268
One current academician.
One former military leader or one former prison
administrator.269
One former member of law enforcement.270
One lawyer (familiar with civil due process
protections).271
The ethicist or clergy member should chair the board, as well as
empanel the board from a pro bono list made available by
professional organizations or by way of an official call for board
volunteers.
Members should not receive remuneration or anything of value
in exchange for their service and should not be appointed by the
prison.272 While having local members would be ideal, there would be
no opposition to members from across jurisdictional lines. In fact,
such would serve to promote national uniformity.
Decisions should be made by the will of four members.
266. These professionals were selected because of their unique professional ability to
(1) make a critical analysis of the impact of isolation on the mental and emotional health
of the inmate; and (2) earnestly appreciate the genuineness of the inmate's attempts at
compliance with the case plan.
267. These people were included because of their specialized ability to (1) educate the
board as to legitimate obstacles that might plague the inmate's compliance with the case
plan; and (2) expose uncommon penological concerns that must be understood in order to
achieve the best resolution of the matter before the board.
268. This person was selected because it is expected that this professional offers (1) a
measured ability to assess a multidimensional situation; (2) a realistic perspective on
managing unpleasant situations involving a range of personality types; and (3) knowledge
of best practice and current trends as it relates to corrections and/or dispute resolution.
269. It is anticipated that these professionals will offer valuable insights into (1) an
authoritarian management model; and (2) security operations and risks.
270. This professional was selected because of (1) an ability to utilize trained instincts;
and (2) because of his regular interfacement with the criminal mentality.
271. This professional offers (1) the creativity to fashion workable solutions; (2)
understanding of the intricate nature of due process protections; and (3) experiences that
serve as a backdrop for appreciating the position of both sides to the proceeding.
272. While work without pay is not the most ideal solution, this recommendation was
adopted out of a fear that pay would bring about the incentive to continue the custody
assignment to isolation or that pay would burden already stretched corrections budgets.
While monetary payment is opposed, an award of professional service hours would not be.
On this issue, the most profound consideration is the nobility that surfaces when one
serves with no motivation other than good will. The ultimate intent here is to capitalize on
the genuineness of this practice.
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4. Periodic Review Determinations (by Prison Officials or by
Special Review Board)
The aim should be a determination of whether the inmate
satisfied the case plan or if the inmate made a genuine
attempt at satisfying the case plan.
The inmate's release from confinement should be viewed
on par with the prison administration's administrative and
management concerns.
The warden must articulate the penological interest at issue
and present verifiable reasons for the placement request.
The warden's views should be considered. The warden's
statement should be treated as equal to the other evidence.
Psychological evaluations should be an integral part of
every review proceeding. They should be treated as equal
to the other evidence.
The inmate's disciplinary record should be an integral part
of every review proceeding. It should be treated as equal
to the other evidence. The absence of recent infractions
should be persuasive, but not outcome determinative.
Release denials should require a short statement of reasons
for continued confinement, as well as articulation of future
release criteria in the form of a supplemental case plan.m
Decisions should be made upon a showing of a
preponderance of actual evidence to justify keeping a
person in isolation. Said evidence should establish that the
prisoner "poses a credible continuing and serious threat to
the security of others or to the prisoner's own safety." 7 1
273. This recommendation is consistent with the ABA's Standards on Treatment of
Prisoners. Recommendation 23-2.9(b), states:
Within [thirty days] of a prisoner's placement in long-term segregated housing
based on a finding that the prisoner presents a continuing and serious threat to
the security of others, correctional authorities should develop an individualized
plan for the prisoner. The plan should include an assessment of the prisoner's
needs, a strategy for correctional authorities to assist the prisoner in meeting
those needs, and a statement of the expectations for the prisoner to progress
toward fewer restrictions and lower levels of custody based on the prisoner's
behavior. Correctional authorities should provide the plan or a summary of it to
the prisoner, and explain it, so that the prisoner can understand such
expectations.
See Standards on Treatment of Prisoners, supra note 51.
274. This is consistent with recommendation 23-2.9 of the ABA's Standards on
Treatment of Prisoners. See id. (calling for a showing by a preponderance of the evidence
when an inmate is placed in or maintained in segregated housing).
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Expert opinions may be considered during the review
process. If used, they should be treated as equal to the
other evidence.
5. Court's Role in the Review Process
The review should extend to the procedure afforded, as
well as to the merits of the adverse finding. When
reviewing the merits, the aim should be a determination of
whether the inmate satisfied the case plan or if the inmate
made a genuine attempt at satisfying the case plan.
When reviewing the merits, courts should ensure:
The burden of proof was met.
The inmate's release from confinement was
viewed on par with the prison administration's
administrative and management concerns.
Due process was afforded. This means that:
a. Substantively, the inmate had the opportunity
to show that no credible continuing and serious
threat to the security of others or to the prisoner's
own safety exists.
b. A sincere effort was made at determining if the
inmate satisfied or genuinely attempted to satisfy
the case plan.
c. The current punishment is connected to a
current security concern and not a dated one.
d. The current punishment is connected to a
legitimate security threat and not a perceived one.
e. The decision was made upon a showing of a
preponderance of actual evidence establishing
that the prisoner poses a credible continuing and
serious threat to the security of others or to the
prisoner's own safety.
After six periodic reviews (under the same case/issue),
judicial review may be sought by any aggrieved party
(prison official or the inmate).
I anticipate dissents based on the notion that implementing this
model would unduly burden already overwhelmed corrections
officials. A like argument was raised before the Supreme Court in
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.275 The Court rejected the government's claim
that imposition of a trial-like system for enemy combatants would
275. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534-35 (2004).
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create practical difficulties and serve as a distraction to military
officials engaged in the serious business of warfare and national
security.2 76 Not only did the Supreme Court refuse to dispense with
due process protections, the Court reiterated that "the process due in
any given instance is determined by weighing the private interest that
will be affected by the official action against the Government's
asserted interest and the burdens the Government would face in
providing greater process."27 7 However, the burden of implementing
the proposed model would be minimal because there are no major
additional costs to be incurred. In fact, the proposed national model
offers many cost-effective advantages including support, relief, and
assistance to prison officials.
For those who fear the proposed legislation would diminish
agency autonomy and simultaneously result in bureaucratic
entanglement, it is worth noting that comparable federal legislation
exists in the arena of animal research. This legislation applies to
living, as well as dead, animals. Disturbingly, this standard exceeds
current protections for living humans subject to isolation.278  The
legislation begins with an official policy expressing: (1) the
government's intent "to ensure that animals intended for use in
research facilities or for exhibition purposes or for use as pets are
provided humane care and treatment" 279 ; and (2) a finding by
Congress that regulation of said industry is essential.28 Subsequent to
this, the legislation requires the Secretary of Agriculture to
promulgate "humane standards and recordkeeping requirements"
associated with the industry.2 8 These standards "ensure that animal
pain and distress are minimized." 28 2  To craft the standards, the
Secretary of Agriculture "is authorized and directed to consult
experts, including outside consultants where indicated." 283 The law
requires that a Research Facility Committee exist at each research
facility for the purpose of assessing animal care and treatment and
research practices from the standpoint of animal welfare.' This
276. See id. at 531.
277. See id. at 529.
278. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2132(g) (West 2012).
279. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2131(1) (West 2012).
280. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2131 (West 2012).
281. See 7 U.S.C.A. §§ 2142-2143 (West 2012).
282. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2143(3)(A) (West 2012).
283. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2143(5) (West 2012).
284. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2143(8)(b)(1) (West 2012).
committee must be composed of a veterinarian and a neutral and
detached party, and must conduct semiannual inspections.285 The law
also requires that staff be trained in humane practices and minimal
pain methodology,' and grants the Secretary of Agriculture authority
to investigate and inspect facilities." In cases of suspected abuses,
the law equips the Secretary of Agriculture with the authority to seek
an injunction.28 Consistent with the proposed prolonged isolation
legislation, the referenced legislation does not cloak one individual
with sole decision-making authority. This legislation anticipates a
uniform standard and envisions specially trained personnel to ensure
its proper implementation. In the final analysis, what might have
initially seemed like bureaucratic layers has actually eliminated
complication because of the existence of a uniform standard and the
delegation of authority.
Conclusion
Some estimate there to be between 50,000 and 80,000 inmates in
solitary confinement in this country on any given day. 289 Given the
broad appeal of prolonged isolation, there must exist a uniform and
constitutionally sound periodic review process. There is simply no
way to refute the urgency of the present. This process should not rob
prison officials of needed authority, but also must not mute the voices
of inmates subject to the prolonged nature of the confinement for
reasons that do not amount to legitimate penological interests or
security concerns. Perception profiling and arbitrary use of
prolonged isolation and/or abuse of prolonged isolation as a
management style is inconsistent with best practices, as well as with
constitutional mandates. Incidentally, Louisiana does not allow a veil
of secrecy to surround the fate of abused animals after they have been
rescued. By the strength of law, the rescuer "shall keep a special
book for the purpose of registering any animal entrusted to their care
... and the book shall be open to inspection at all times." 290 Under
285. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2143(8)(b)(1)(A) (West 2012); see also 7 U.S.C.A. §
2143(8)(b)(3) (West 2012).
286. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2143(8)(4)(C)(5)(d) (West 2012).
287. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2146 (West 2012).
288. See 7 U.S.C.A. § 2159 (West 2012).
289. See Cruel and Unusual: US Solitary Confinement, supra note 66.
290. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 3:2434.
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this legislation, research facilities must be inspected, and they must
produce annual reports showing compliance with standards.2 91
When prison officials stop acting as administrators and
effectively begin handing down sentences, they, for all practical
purposes, become judges. The Separation of Powers Doctrine
prohibits prison officials from acting with this authority. When judges
abstain from meaningful involvement in the periodic review process,
they look, but fail to see the very thing they are uniquely positioned
to see. They do not see the need for justice and interpretation of
law-due process law. The judge, by his omission, renders justice
legally blind as far as the inmate is concerned. The legally blind can
innocently be a detriment to those around them.
Incarceration by its very nature invites condescension toward
and perhaps even disdain for inmates. But it offers no reason or
excuse to diminish the rights or the humanity of the incarcerated.
Affording justice to inmates does not and should not depend on the
good faith or forbearance of prison officials. It is mandated by our
form of government. Mindless insistence on maintaining order in
prisons without concern for the rights of inmates is antipodal to
democracy.
Due process looks to the "justice of the procedure itself." 29 2 A
simulated process akin to a hearing, where formalities can be
documented, but where no meaningful probing occurs, is unjust and
unconstitutional. It amounts to nothing more than procedural
automation in a legal assembly line where unfavorable reviews are
mass-produced. As a body of citizens, we must declare our legacy.
As the inscription near the last guard post at Angola expresses, "[wle
can't change the past."29 3 Will our legacy be that we got stuck at this
place of reflection or will we embark upon a journey to progress,
remembering that "[c]ommitment to change must be combined with
readiness to confront authority"?2 94 Some have begun the process of
declaring our legacy. They have done this by picking up the torch and
291. See id.
292. See Resnick, supra note 183.
293. See Sullivan, Why Did Key Angola Witness Go to the "Dog Pen"?, supra note 139
(observing that "[als you leave Angola, you can see the dormitories, the officers in their
guard shacks, the men bent over in the cotton fields. It's the same as it looked 40 years
ago, and 100 years ago. At the last guard post, there is an inscription. It's a Bible verse,
Philippians 3:12. It says we can't change the past; we can only press on to the future.").
294. DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT
PROTESTER 162 (1994).
moving it in the direction of meaningful change.295 Others have
ignited the legislative fire.296 Much like those in prolonged isolation,
these citizens cry out for the company and support of others.
295. The Office of the Inspector General for the State of California conducted a
special review of the management of administrative segregation units in California adult
prisons. Two findings were made and twelve recommendations were offered. Of note, the
report identified repeat instances of due process violations. See DAVID R. SHAW, STATE
OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL REVIEW: MANAGEMENT OF THE
CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION'S




Joseph Ponte, Maine's new corrections commissioner, has set abuses of solitary
confinement as his top priority. He recently made the following significant changes:
Included prisoner-rights advocates to a department committee designating reforms,
prohibited the mentally ill from being placed in solitary confinement, stopped the practice
of putting inmates into solitary confinement based on a single disciplinary infraction,
limited the use of solitary confinement only to cases where an inmate is a threat to himself
or others, and stopped the use of administrative segregation. Mr. Ponte offers the
professional view that solitary confinement did not change behavior whereas the new
practice of informal sanctions (i.e., loss of recreation time or loss of commissary privileges)
does. He concedes his approach is more labor intensive, but he is sure the benefits
outweigh the challenges. See generally, Lance Tapley, Reducing Solitary Confinement,
PORTLAND PHOENIX (Nov. 2, 2011), http://portland.thephoenix.com/news/129316-
reducing-solitary-confinement/.
It is reported that Illinois Senator Paul Simon approached corrections officials to
express concern for the plight of an inmate who, at the time, was housed in solitary
confinement. See Gawande, supra note 4.
After learning about the plight of the Angola 3, Cedric Richmond engaged in talks with
Louisiana officials concerning classification procedures for inmates held in prolonged
isolation. See draft version of LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:828.4 (on file with the author).
On April 6, 2011, Congressmen John Conyers, Bobby Scott, and Cedric Richmond
sponsored a Congressional Briefing on the abuses of solitary confinement in the criminal
justice system. See CONGRESSMEN JOHN CONYERS, ROBERT SCOTT & CEDRIC
RICHMOND, THE ABUSES OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM (Apr. 6, 2011), http://solitarywatch.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/congressional-
briefing-flyer.pdf.
In 2009, a documentary examining the Angola 3 case was directed by Vadim Jean and
narrated by Samuel L. Jackson. See IN THE LAND OF THE FREE, supra note 139.
A New Mexico jury awarded $22 million to Stephen Slevin after he was arrested and held
in solitary confinement without ever having been brought to trial. Ultimately, the charges
brought against him were dropped. See Paul Vale, Stephen Slevin: Man Locked in Solitary
Confinement for Two Years Wins $22m Payout, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 27, 2012),
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2012/01/27/stephen-slevin-man-locked_n-1236414.html?.
296. In Colorado, SB176 was signed by the Governor on June 3, 2011. It requires that
an annual report concerning the status of administrative segregation, reclassification
efforts for offenders with mental illnesses or developmental disabilities, and any internal
reform efforts since July 1, 2011, be provided to the judiciary committees of the Senate
and House of Representatives, or any successor committees. It also permits accrual of
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earned time after ninety days for offenders housed in solitary confinement provided they
meet statutory criteria. Lastly, it stops the practice of placing inmates in solitary
confinement for inmates who merely associate with a member of a security threat group.
The legislation requires that the offender engage in threatening behavior or participate in
actions of a security threat group in order to qualify for solitary confinement, while
preserving the discretion of the warden. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17-1-113.9 (1)
(West 2012), available at http://www.leg.state.co.us/clics/clics20lla/csl.nsflfsbillcont3/
A88F4FFC795C5C79872578080080E624?open&file=176_enr.pdf.
In Maine, a bill to reduce the use of special management units by the Department of
Corrections and to reduce the length of time that prisoners in the custody of the
Department of Corrections are confined in special management units was proposed. This
bill also proposed a mechanism for a person confined in a special management unit for
more than thirty days to have that person's case reviewed by an independent third party.
See L.D. 963, 125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011), available at
http://www.mainelegislature.org/legis/bills/bills 125th/billtexts/HP070701.asp. After this
bill died, the legislature ordered a review of due process and other policies related to
placement of special management prisoners. See L.D. 1611, 124th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Me. 2011).
In March 2011, the Maine Department of Corrections returned a report that included
many recommendations to improve due process and other policies related to the use of
solitary confinement. See FINAL REPORT OF REVIEW OF DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES IN
SPECIAL MANAGEMENT UNITS AT THE MAINE STATE PRISON AND THE MAINE
CORRECTIONAL CENTER (March 2011), available at http://www.nrcat.org/storage/nrcat/
documents/usp-maine-proposed amendmentto_1d1163.pdf.
Subsequently, Maine passed a resolve directing its Department of Corrections to
respond to the recommendations contained in the review of due process procedures and
other policies related to the placement of special management prisoners. See L.D. 1163,
125th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2011); see also Judy Harrison, MCLU to Honor Trio for
Work with Prisoners, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Oct. 12, 2010, available at 2010 WLNR
20392339 (reporting that the 2010 Roger Baldwin Award was conferred upon Reverend
Stan Moody, Dr. Janis Petzel and Emily Posner, currently a law student at Loyola
University New Orleans College of Law, for their "extraordinary contributions" towards
ending solitary confinement in Maine).
In Mississippi, Unit 32 was an administrative segregation, male housing unit which held
men who committed disciplinary infractions, were mentally ill, or were in need of
protective custody. Many were held in Unit 32 indefinitely. A settlement resulted in the
closure of Unit 32, a new classification system, and implementation of written plans and
reviews for those left in solitary confinement. See Winter & Hanlon, supra, note 75, at 6-
8.
In 2011, New Mexico passed legislation convening a working group to gather
information about the use of solitary confinement, its impact on prisoners, and its
effectiveness in reducing prison issues and costs. This group will produce an initial report
of its findings and recommendations by October 2012, and a final report will be presented
to the appropriate interim legislative committee by October 2013. See S.M. 40, 50th Leg.,
1st Sess. (N.M. 2011), available at http://www.nmlegis.gov/sessions/11%20regular/
memorials/senate/SM040.html.
In January 2008, New York signed into effect its Special Housing Unit Exclusion law
(enacted July 1, 2011). This law protects seriously mentally ill inmates from being placed
in solitary confinement and instead requires that appropriate mental health treatment be
provided. See N.Y. LAW § 43:6-137 (McKinney 2011), available at http://assembly.state.
ny.us/leg/?default-fld=&bn=A09342&term=2007&Summary=Y&Text=Y; see also Press
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Release, N.Y. Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, Assembly Restores Funding in State
Budget to Implement Critical Prison Reform for Mentally Ill Inmates (Mar. 30, 2009),
available at http://assembly.state.ny.us/Press/20090330fl.
In Texas, a 2011 bill that would have directed the Texas Department of Criminal Justice
to submit an annual report to the Legislature on the use of solitary confinement and to
establish a plan to improve the conditions of confinement for those prisoners held in
administrative segregation failed. See H.B. 3764, 82nd Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011), available at
http://www.capitol.state.tx.us/tlodocs/82R/billtext/pdflHBO3764H.pdf#navpanes=O.
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